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INTRODUCTION
Max Weber’s theory on the origins of capitalism has created, after over a century of
intense scrutiny, one certainty: “…one fact emerges from the debate: it is just as difficult
to demolish Weber’s thesis as it is to substantiate it.”1 The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit
of Capitalism is dismissed by some as overly speculative and embraced by others as
providing unparalleled insight into the significance of social phenomena. Regardless of
where one may be positioned along this spectrum, the debate has been sustained and
fruitful, evolving over time and reflecting changes in academic discourse and
methodology.
These discussions, however, have often fixated on the question: was Weber right?2
This is not surprising considering that Weber’s pithy analysis has, upon first glance, the
compelling and attractive appeal of an argument tailored according to Occam’s razor:
modern capitalism3 was the product of Protestantism. For some, the allure of this initial

1

Hamilton, 169.
As noted throughout this analysis, this is by no means the case for all commentators who have addressed
Weber’s essay.
3
Weber distinguishes between capitalism and “modern” capitalism, the latter being his primary concern.
For instance, Weber characterizes modern capitalism as “coloured with utilitarianism.” More specifically,
Weber sees modern capitalism as possessing “the character of an ethically coloured maxim for the conduct
of life” (see Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism [hereafter referred to as “PE”], 51-2).
In this analysis, I will largely use the terms interchangeably (as Weber often does), though when I speak of
“capitalism” My use of the term is discursive, meant to indicate the processes, organizations, and
institutions that emerged primarily in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries and which produced the
modern capitalist world in which we live today. Rightly or wrongly, Weber saw this spirit of modern
capitalism as embodied in Benjamin Franklin (see PE, 48-51). Weber notes that what distinguishes
capitalism from modern capitalism is the presence of a capitalist ethic; that is to say, the pursuit of worldly
gain became no longer just a means of subsistence or even profit, but a binding end in itself, the foundation
of a worldview in which one situates his or her perception of his or her position in the world largely in
terms of economic activity. Thus, Weber writes:
Truly what is here preached is not simply a means of making one’s way in the world, but
a peculiar ethic. The infraction of its rules is treated not as foolishness but as
forgetfulness of duty. That is the essence of the matter. It is not mere business astuteness,
that sort of thing is common enough, it is an ethos. This is the quality which interests us
(PE, 51, emphasis in original).
The implications here of institutionally binding constraints is something I discuss in greater detail below.
2
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impression never faded and for others any attempt to explain as intricate an historical
phenomenon as capitalism by assessing the impact of a few, closely-related religious
sects seemed akin to blasphemy against the complexity of history. Either way, Weber’s
thesis was the spark for a plethora of insightful historical analyses and criticisms. Yet the
question of whether or not Weber was right, though it made for interesting analysis and
discussion, is somewhat misleading. Weber was calling for the beginning of an
investigation and never suggested that his analysis was the conclusion to such an
investigation. He never asserts that Protestantism was the “answer” to how modern
capitalism emerged, only that it showed a surprising and fascinating role in capitalism’s
development.
The efforts to “answer” the questions raised by Weber have resulted in diverting
attention away from the intellectual lessons of Weber’s analysis. Instead, efforts have
been directed towards accessing a particular historical “truth,” i.e. one that would prove
or disprove Weber’s thesis. After one hundred years of scrutiny, one must ask whether
the debate has begun to exhaust itself, and if the modern-day usefulness of continuing the
debate over the veracity of Weber’s thesis is questionable. This analysis asserts that it is
time to redirect our efforts away from proving or disproving and towards better
understanding the way in which Weber’s essay, as an entity unto itself, speaks to our
continuing attempts to understand history, the world around us, and, most important of
all, change.
At the age of twenty-one, Karl Marx wrote in a note on his doctoral dissertation on
Democritus and Epicurus that,
It is conceivable that a philosopher should be guilty of this or that inconsistency
because of this or that compromise; he may himself be conscious of it. But what
he is not conscious of is that… this apparent compromise is made possible by the
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deficiency of his principles or an inadequate grasp of them. So if a philosopher
really has compromised it is the job of his followers to use the inner core of his
thought to illuminate his own superficial expressions of it. In this way, what is a
progress in conscience is also a progress in knowledge. This does not involve
putting the conscience of a philosopher under suspicion, but rather construing the
essential characteristics of his views, giving them a definite form and meaning,
and thus at the same time going beyond them.4

This is, no doubt, an early example of Marx’s many commentaries on Hegel’s
philosophy, and it carries a particularly significant resonance in the intentions of this
analysis. Namely, the purpose of this analysis is to “go beyond” the standard approaches
to and interpretations of Weber’s thesis, to probe the mechanisms behind its assertions,
and explore the implications of these findings for the way in which we understand
historical change.
This analysis uses Douglass North’s Institutions, Institutional Change, and Economic
Performance to uncover the mechanisms of change at work in Weber’s historical account
of the emergence of modern capitalism. In doing so, I argue that Weber offers a useful
model for understanding historical change through his emphasis on the subjectivity of
reality, intentions, and the effect of changing costs on behavior and institutional norms.
While Weber has been shown to have faults as an historian, his thesis provides original
insight into the relationship between the ideologies and beliefs to which humans ascribe
and the institutions under which they live. At the center of this hermeneutical exercise is
a question that Weber, himself, found perplexing: how do components of religious
institutions outlive the theological constructs in which they developed? How does what
Weber describes as the Protestant “calling” (beruf) transform into a secular “spirit”
(geist) of capitalism? And why is it that “The Puritan wanted to work in a calling,” but

4

From Marx’s “Notes to the Dissertation,” McLellan, 17.
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“we are forced to do so.”5 In attempting to answer these questions, Weber offers
considerable insight into the nature of institutional change and stability.
As explained in Chapters I and II, North’s analysis is particularly helpful because it
sheds light on the mechanisms of change that are not explicitly stated in Weber’s
analysis. That is to say, Weber clearly identifies Protestantism as the vehicle for
institutional change that contributed to the development of modern capitalism, but he
does not explicitly explain the causal relationship between this vehicle and the changes
themselves. North’s model for understanding institutions and institutional change allows
us to pinpoint a specific mechanism of institutional change: cost. As explained below,
North’s approach to institutions is particularly useful and relevant because of its focus on
the importance of costs. I assert that the relationship between cost, behavior, and change
is central to understanding the plausibility of Weber’s thesis and, more importantly, in
extrapolating lessons from his thesis that are relevant to the contemporary study of
history and politics.
This essay is organized into four parts followed by concluding remarks. Chapter I
establishes the connection between the assumptions that Weber and North bring to their
respective analyses. The goal here is to justify the discourse I construct between these
two authors despite the significant temporal distance and the seemingly different subject
matters they address. I begin by discussing the issue of rationalization, one of the most
prominent themes in all of Weber’s works and one that I argue is distinctly institutional
in nature. In doing so, I note that Weber has a clear understanding of the modern
capitalistic world as one filled with institutional structures, especially constraints and
incentives. Central to this discussion is my assertion that both Weber and North
5

See PE, 181.
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understand reality as being subjective, hence both authors believe the decisions and
actions of individuals and groups are determined by the way in which they interpret their
surroundings. In this sense, North accommodates a theory grounded on the importance of
religious beliefs such as Weber’s. Alternatively, Weber complements North’s analysis by
providing a thorough discussion of the relationship between institutional change and
beliefs, on which North only touches.
Chapter II constructs an institutions theory interpretation of Weber’s thesis, focusing
on the way in which Reformation religious beliefs changed the costs that individuals and
groups would incur by engaging in “capitalistic” behavior.6 The purpose of this chapter is
two-fold: first, it seeks to provide insight into the unexpressed mechanisms of change at
work in Weber’s thesis. I argue that according to Weber’s account, the Reformation
lowered the social, psychological, and “spiritual” cost of engaging in previously
prohibited behaviors that are central to the development of modern capitalism, such as the
accumulation of wealth and a tireless work ethic. This suggests that there is a relationship
between beliefs and institutional costs. Second, in constructing this reinterpretation, I
conclude that an institutions theory interpretation of Weber’s thesis shows that his
argument is plausible and theoretically sound. The purpose of this is not to prove
Weber’s argument one way or the other, but to show that his reasoning is sound,
implying that such reasoning might be applicable to other periods of historical change.

6

Throughout this analysis, I use the terms “capitalist” and “capitalistic” behavior interchangeably. Weber
provides a useful characterization of this behavior: “We will define economic action as one which rests on
the expectation of profit by the utilization of opportunities for exchange, that is on (formally) peaceful
chances of profit… Where capitalistic acquisition is rationally pursued, the corresponding action is adjusted
to calculations in terms of capital” (PE, 17-18). Thus, by capitalist or capitalistic behavior, I mean that an
individual’s or group’s resources are organized for the pursuit of profit or gain (as opposed to sustenance)
in a systematic manner.
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In Chapter III, I take this defense of the plausibility of Weber’s argument further still
by holding it against some of the most prominent and outspoken critics of The Protestant
Ethic. I focus on many critics’ tendency to misrepresent Weber’s claims and how the
insight of institutions theory provides us with a new way to respond to Weber’s critics. I
use Felix Rachfahl’s, a contemporary of Weber, early criticisms as a starting point for
this. The purpose of this chapter is to highlight, once again, the enduring plausibility of
Weber’s argument. In addition, it is intended as a brief commentary on the way in which
scholars and commentators are often overly critical of analyses that aim to blend
disciplines (in this case, sociology, religious studies, and history).
In light of the arguments set forth in Chapters II and III, Chapter IV seeks to “go
beyond” Weber’s text. The broader goal of this chapter is to extract the lessons of The
Protestant Ethic from the text itself so that they may be applied to significant historical
situations and periods outside of the Reformation. This is accomplished by juxtaposing
Weber’s thesis with two different accounts of the development of modern capitalism,
neither of which uses Weber’s approach as a model, i.e. in contrast to the efforts of
scholars like Werner Sombart (see Chapter III). First, I turn to Albert Hirschman’s The
Passions and the Interests to highlight the importance of intentions in understanding
historical change. Second, I address Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation, in which I
compare Weber’s and Polanyi’s approach to institutional change. These juxtapositions, I
argue, show that Weber’s thesis is unique in recognizing the importance of both
intentions and unintended consequences while providing a specific mechanism for
institutional change and stability, cost. Such a mechanism, I assert, is lacking in both
Hirschman’s and Polanyi’s analyses.
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Lastly, this chapter explores the implications and possible applications of these
observations by addressing Rogers Brubaker’s account of developing national identities
in the Soviet sub-states. In doing so, I show that Brubaker’s historical account can be
cogently explained in terms of the intentions and mechanisms that Weber addresses in his
analysis, and that this is indicative of the ways in which Weber’s approach may be useful
in understanding other periods of historical change. In the final chapter, I conclude by
reflecting on the implications of this analysis for how we approach history and our
current society.
It deserves reiteration that this analysis is not primarily concerned with any actual
relationship between religion and the rise of capitalism, nor is it concerned with being an
endnote or epilogue to an ongoing debate surrounding The Protestant Ethic. Any
“defense” made of the plausibility of Weber’s argument is not meant to endorse the
stance that Protestantism led to modern capitalism or that capitalism could not have
existed without Protestantism (indeed, this was not even Weber’s purpose), but rather to
highlight the genius of Weber’s approach and argue that there is much that can be learned
from this approach. This analysis is more concerned with the way in which our
understanding of history and the present develops, rather than with the insights –“right or
wrong”– of any single philosopher or scholar. Furthermore, while I touch on the broader
themes of religion and rationalization in Weber’s career as a thinker, this analysis focuses
on The Protestant Ethic alone, and one of its limitations is that it does not survey
Weber’s impressive corpus (or North’s, for that matter). This is not meant as an
indication that Weber’s other works are insignificant or less significant, but is instead

10
meant to provide narrow focus to this analysis and to emphasize that I am pursuing the
lessons of this particular text, rather than those of Weber’s broader corpus.
The purpose here is to show that as scholars such as Douglass North provide
groundbreaking insight into the way the modern world works, we are not only obligated
to reconsider the workings of that world and how it came to be as it is (history), but we
are also obligated to return to the historical accounts and theories that arose over time and
reassess their value. In this vein, this essay shows that an analysis that has been allegedly
“invalidated” by some critics still, in fact, provides lessons for modern approaches to
complicated historical developments. This is what Marx meant by trying to uncover
“form and meaning” and it is the intention from which this analysis proceeds.

11

CHAPTER I
ESTABLISHING THE WEBER-NORTH CONNECTION
That Weber’s and North’s works go “hand in hand” may seem, at first, counter-intuitive.
Aside from the eighty-five years elapsed between the first publications of Weber’s
Protestant Ethic and North’s Institutions, it is not immediately evident that the two works
complement one another. The authors themselves seem like an odd pair: Weber is a
founding father of modern sociology, North is an economist and historian. Many
characterize Weber’s Protestant Ethic as a rebuttal to Marx’s theory of historical
materialism while North, himself, was once a self-proclaimed Marxist. Weber’s analysis
addresses changes in religious ideas, focusing on specific events and figures, quotes
liturgies and texts, and focuses on human emotions, psychology, and beliefs. North, on
the other hand, is concerned with broad institutions and organizations, where the
individual and his or her beliefs might appear to be of secondary importance.
One could continue to name differences between the two. There are, no doubt, many
to list. However, they share fundamental similarities that unite the cores of their
respective analyses. This chapter will explore these similarities, focusing on the way in
which the rationalization of society, a driving force in Weber’s works, is a distinctly
institutional matter, closely related to the issues addressed by North and prevalent
throughout The Protestant Ethic. Furthermore, I will show that both authors understand
reality as subjective, and both recognize that it is not what “is” that is necessarily
important in understanding historical events, but what is perceived to be that sheds light
on the nature of historical change. These similarities are the grounds for a deeper
exploration of the discourse that emerges between the two texts.

12

i. Rationalization and Weber’s Understanding of History
Few phenomena so captivated Weber as the ongoing process of what he called
rationalization, the increasing orderliness, sophistication, and complexity of human
society on all levels. It is a central theme in The Protestant Ethic, but Weber’s fascination
with it was evident in other important texts as well, such as The Sociology of Religion.7
Alan Sica describes Weber’s “discovery” in further detail:
His discovery, if it can be so called, held that modern societies are forever striving to
order what in its ‘natural’ state is less ordered or even randomly occurring. Where people
once noisily milled about, now they are put in rows or ranks of quiet obedience; where
fiscal accounting was done from memory and rough approximation, now it is taken to the
hundredth of one percentage point, or beyond; where music was the work of a single
minstrel inventing melodies and lyrics as he strolled, now it requires an orchestra that
plays perfectly in unison from a printed score, willful deviation from which is a cardinal
sin… And while he recognized in these developments admirable achievements,
particularly in the production of material goods, he saw as well those seedbeds of
pathology that affected individuals as much as the societies in which they struggled,
vainly he thought, to maintain their individuality and freedom.8

To call it one of Weber’s “interests” is a vast understatement. The Protestant Ethic is
one of Weber’s earliest and more ambitious attempts to grapple with this phenomenon
described by Sica above. Anthony Giddens explains that Weber’s interest in religion was
directly related to his attempt to understand rationalization: “the influence of religious
ethics upon economic organisation is to be considered above all from one specific
standpoint: in terms of their connections with the advance or retardation of rationalization
such as has come to dominate economic life in the West.”9 We see below that North’s

7

See, for example, Weber, The Sociology of Religion, 36. Weber’s fascination with rationalization of
human society went hand in hand with Entzauberung, the recession of the active role of magic in human
beliefs and human understanding of the world.
8
Sica, 42. Sica’s closing sentence here refers to Weber’s “iron cage” of rational society (referred to at the
end of The Protestant Ethic), which I discuss on page 12 below.
9
Giddens, 169. Indeed, Weber himself gives us a taste of this fuel for his extensive work in religious
studies and sociology when he refers to “That great historical process in the development of religions, the
elimination of magic from the world” which refers to the rationalization of religions which reached its apex
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method sheds light on Weber’s concept of rationalization and provides a means for
expressing what Weber found, in many ways, inexpressible. Thus, I begin by addressing
what Weber meant by rationalization and what significance it has for his Protestant Ethic
thesis.
Above I described Weber’s conception of rationalization as one of increasing
orderliness and complexity of human society on all levels. This is a simple definition, but
it is sufficient in describing the web of social and economic phenomena with which
Weber was concerned. The entire introduction of The Protestant Ethic is a European
liturgy on the sophistication of Occidental society. Weber sees the complex
rationalization of Western society (superior to that of China or India, to which he points
regularly as representative of Eastern societies) as pervasive. According to Weber,
Western superiority is evident in historical scholarship, music, architecture, science, and
law.10
These observations, however ungrounded or biased one may find them, led Weber to
one of his essay’s central questions: “Why did not the scientific, the artistic, the political,
or the economic development there [in China or India] enter upon that path of
rationalization which is peculiar to the Occident?”11 Thus, the essay’s introduction
provides us with insight into the nature of rationalization for Weber: rationalization
possesses unmistakable traits of complexity and sophistication, and its influence is
observable in everything from art to science. Rationalization is closely akin to what many

in Puritanism (where the “elimination” “came here to its logical conclusion”) and then escaped religion
altogether in capitalism (See PE, 105).
10
PE, 14-16, 24-25.
11
PE, 25.
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would colloquially call “progress” during Weber’s time, and Weber’s sees rationalization
as the driving force of societal progress.
This central question noted above marks the first, and most obvious, similarity
between Weber’s and North’s analyses. Just as Weber explains early on that he is
concerned with understanding why the West rose to its place of prominence on the global
stage, North explains, on the first page of his analysis, that, “The primary objective of the
study is to achieve an understanding of the differential performance of economies
through time…”12 In other words, North wants to address why part of the world is
“developed” while another is “developing.” Thus, it comes as no surprise that there are
connections between the two works given that the authors set out on the same task. This
similarity because it does not, in itself, establish a substantive link between the two
works; and it is noted here because it is the first hint that a substantive link exists at all.
In addition to increasing complexity, Weber sees rationalization expressed in
specialized labor, self control, intellectual and personal reflection, and regimented daily
routine. Thus, Weber asserts that the greatest contribution of ascetic Christians in the
Middle Ages to the emergence of modern capitalism was their development of
a systematic method of rational conduct with the purpose of overcoming the status
naturæ, to free man from the power of irrational impulses and his dependence on the
world and on nature. [Asceticism] attempted to subject man to the supremacy of a
purposeful will, to bring his actions under constant self-control with a careful
consideration of their ethical consequences.13

By giving birth to asceticism, Weber sees the mediaeval Christian monk as one of the
seeds from which the rationalization culminating in modern capitalism emerges. The
emergence of rationalization, which Weber (rightly or wrongly) characterizes as a

12

North, 3. Unless otherwise specified, all North citations hereafter refer to Institutions, Institutional
Change, and Economic Performance.
13
PE, 118-9.
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distinctly Western trend, places Weber’s chronological starting point centuries prior to
Luther or Calvin. Weber does not believe that rationalization or even capitalism begins
with the Protestant Reformation,14 rather he argues that the Protestant Reformation
caused an important transformation in the development of these societal phenomena.
Critics such as Karl Fischer, a contemporary of Weber who pointed out that the idea of
the “calling” did not originate with Luther or the Reformation,15 fail to recognize the
simple fact that Weber’s starting point predates the Reformation itself. This point of
contention, the incorrect assertion that Weber claims the Reformation created capitalism,
is an issue I address in Chapter III.
Protestantism and its notion of the “calling” (discussed in greater detail in Chapter II)
brought ascetic rationalization from out of the monasteries to the masses in Europe and
later North America. Whereas the orderliness of monastic life had previously left the
“naturally spontaneous character of daily life in the world untouched… Now it strode
into the market-place of life, slammed the door of the monastery behind it, and undertook
to penetrate just that daily routine of life with its methodicalness…”16 North’s theory of
institutions can help explain the mechanism by which asceticism could not only “slam the
door” to the monastery, but to the Church and religion in general.
Weber’s concern with economics and economic behavior, i.e. his attempt to
understand the origins of modern capitalism, was only the surface of his deeper desire to
understand the ongoing rationalization of Europe and North America. By equating
rationalization with increasing orderliness, productivity, and sophisticated regimentation,
Weber’s conception of rationalization demanded that he look for his solutions in the
14

See PE, 52-4.
See Chalcraft, 27.
16
PE, 153-4.
15
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development of modern economics, which seemed to stand at the apex of such a
calculating order that had swept across the Western world. Weber believed rationalization
to be the prevailing winds of his time, and that the modern economy was the best
expression of this trend.
With this in mind, how does North’s theories of institutions and institutional change
help us better understand Weber’s arguments concerning the rationalization of Western
society? First, a reminder as to what North means when he speaks of institutions:
Institutions are the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly devised
constraints that shape human interaction. In consequence they structure incentives in human
exchange, whether political, social, or economic. Institutional change shapes the way societies
evolve through time and hence is the key to understanding historical change.17

Most important here is that institutions a) are systems of constraints and b) that these
constraints create incentive structures to which individuals and organizations respond.
Thus, if Weber’s Protestant Ethic is dealing with institutions as North understands them,
we should see Weber discussing both constraints created by Protestantism as well as the
creation of incentive structures such that individuals and organizations respond to such
structures. This is, indeed, what we find.
It is evident that both Weber and North are concerned with ideologies and beliefs
–they both assert that beliefs influence history. It is important to also note that this
assertion is derived from a similar assumption between the two authors, namely that
reality is subjective. While North is concerned with economic development and change,
he makes clear that the answers to questions concerning economic development are
inextricably linked to a complex web of cultural phenomena. This stands in stark contrast
to the tidy equilibrium theories posed by neoclassical economists. Thus, North writes,
“Our preoccupation with rational choice and efficient market hypotheses has blinded us
17

North, 3.
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to the implications of incomplete information and the complexity of environments and
subjective perceptions of the external world that individuals hold.”18 Indeed, North’s
Institutions is a direct challenge to the foundations of neoclassical theory itself by
challenging the legitimacy of key neoclassical assumptions: the ease of cooperation, the
rationality of actors, and the absence of transaction costs. The implications of these
assertions, and their relation to Weber’s thesis, will now be discussed.

ii. The Common Ground Between Weber and North and the Importance of Subjective Reality
In his acceptance speech for the Nobel Prize in Economics in 1993, North expressed
that he (like Weber) believes that there is a significant connection between beliefs and
economic development:
the beliefs that individuals, groups, and societies hold which determine choices are a
consequence of learning through time –not just the span of an individual's life or of a
generation of a society but the learning embodied in individuals, groups, and societies
that is cumulative through time and passed on intergenerationally by the culture of a
society.19

In sixteenth century Europe, a period at the heart of Weber’s analysis, there were few
forces as saliently present and influential in European culture as religion. Any dispute of
this leading up to the sixteenth century was put to rest when Martin Luther’s religious
tenets touched off the Protestant Reformation, one of the most momentous events in
modern history.
North asserts consistently throughout his analysis that beliefs matter because they
influence the subjective reality within which individuals and groups make choices: “The
perceptions of the actors play a more central role in institutional than in technological

18

North continues later that “we have paid a big price for the uncritical acceptance of neoclassical theory”
(North, 111, 131). I discuss this “big price” later in the analysis.
19
North, “Lecture to the Memory of Alfred Nobel.”

18
change because ideological beliefs influence the subjective construction of the models
that determine choices.”20 The subjectivity of reality is a central tenet upon which North’s
assertions rest: subjective interpretations of reality are why imperfect information exists,
why cooperation can be difficult to achieve, why transaction costs are unavoidable, and
why path-dependent history does not always follow the most efficient course or lead to
the most efficient outcome.
The rational economic actor, the idealized figure upon which neoclassical economic
theory is grounded, is a fiction according to North: it exists only in theory because
individuals’ conceptions of circumstances are constantly skewed both by internal and
external forces. Weber is unwilling to completely discard the notion of the rational
economic actor (though it should not be confused with his notion of rationalization), but,
unlike rational choice theorists, he plainly asserts that rational choice only exists from
within the purview of an individual’s or group’s worldview. What may seem a “rational
choice” to a Calvinist in seventeenth century Switzerland or a Quaker colonial America is
not necessarily the same as the rational choice ascribed to the neoclassical model’s
atomic unit, the rational actor.
Thus, Weber acknowledges that reality is subjective. Two examples make this clear:
his emphasis on the psychological state (on a mass scale) created by the Reformation, and
his analysis of the effect of the calling on the way individuals interpreted their own socioeconomic circumstances. I will address these examples in this order. As stated earlier,
Weber is concerned with the means by which a religious ethic could become a modern
capitalist ethic, and in what way something originating in a theological climate could
survive secularization. By merely asking this question, Weber assumes that reality is
20

North, 103-4.
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subjective. Subjective reality is a precondition for such a transition as that described
above to occur at all: if reality is non-subjective then one cannot expect religious beliefs
to affect practical behavior. In a world where individuals and groups make decisions
based upon “objective” (or even near-objective) cost-benefit analyses, in which empirical
evidence is the only input into these decision processes, there is little room for Protestant
religion in the first place since it is grounded on a notion of faith. The point here is not to
detail Christian theology or beliefs, but rather to note that by acknowledging religion as
an influential force, Weber acknowledges that subjective reality matters because, after all,
religion is a part of that subjective reality.
Thus, Weber writes, “We are interested… in… the influence of those psychological
sanctions which, originating in religious belief and the practice of religion, gave a
direction to practical conduct and held the individual to it.”21 That “psychological
sanctions” have an effect on “practical conduct” is a direct reference to the subjectivity of
reality, an acknowledgment that individuals make decisions, economic decisions
included, based on the ways in which they perceive the world around them. Weber states
this even more explicitly when he writes, “We have preferred rather to take the results
which subjective adoption of an ascetic faith might have had in the conduct of the
individual.”22
In this sense, both Weber and North begin with the common assumption that reality is
subjective, and that one’s actions are determined based upon his or her interpretation of
reality. This holds true for group behavior as well. The difference between the
descriptions offered by the two authors is in diction rather than substance: what Weber
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calls “psychology” North calls “mental construct.”23 This creates an important connection
between Weber’s and North’s analyses. North’s acknowledgment that reality is a
subjective construct is a de facto acceptance of religion –insofar as religion acts as a
worldview affecting an individual’s or group’s perception of the world– being able to
shape decisions and institutions. Denying this would be a rejection of key assumptions in
Weber’s argument. North makes no such denial, instead he points to authors such as
Herbert Simon because his approach “accounts for ideology, based upon subjective
perceptions of reality, playing a major part in human beings’ choices. It brings into play
the complexity and incompleteness of our information and the fumbling efforts we make
to decipher it.”24
“Psychological sanctions,” in themselves, can be interpreted as institutional
constraints –they are conceptions affecting an individual’s decision set. This does not,
however, necessarily constitute the sort of pervasive institutional constraints described by
North. After all, one could have a psychological disorder that influences his or her
decisions, but one would not call such decisions the product of institutions. Nonetheless,
Weber’s use of the term “psychological sanctions” strongly suggests that he is, in fact,
writing about institutional constraints. More specifically, Weber is addressing the
psychological processes by which an individual, wittingly or unwittingly, conforms to
pervasive institutional norms.25 As he describes in vivid detail, this is especially true for
the institutional norms of modern capitalism:
The capitalistic economy of the present day is an immense cosmos into which the
individual is born, and which presents itself to him, at least as an individual, as an
unalterable order of things in which he must live. It forces the individual, in so far as he is
involved in the system of market relationships, to conform to capitalistic rules of action.
23
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The manufacturer who in the long run acts counter to these norms, will just as inevitably
be eliminated from the economic scene as the worker who cannot or will not adapt
himself to them will be thrown into the streets without a job.26

Weber asserts that modern capitalism has created a pervasive “cosmos” of “capitalistic
rules” to which an individual must abide. The origins of these pervasive institutional
constraints (as we can now justifiably identify them) are what Weber is trying to better
understand.
To understand the degree to which Weber thinks these institutions are binding
constraints, one need only look to what is perhaps the most famous metaphor in The
Protestant Ethic: Weber’s “iron cage.”27 Through this powerful imagery, Weber asserts
that the constraints of the rationalized capitalist world are virtually ineluctable. Whereas
before the era of modern capitalism the dominant Western theological tenets held that
“the care for external goods should only lie on the shoulder of the ‘saint like a cloak’,”
the era of modern capitalism, and the institutional constraints it brought with it, make up
an iron cage in which Weber and his contemporaries are trapped. Weber laments the
effect of this imprisonment on human choices and identity, stating that “Perhaps it will so
determine [the lives of all individuals] until the last ton of fossilized coal is burnt.”28
Weber’s account of institutional constraints is a fatalistically extreme form of that
26

PE, 54-5.
It should be noted that this imagery of the “iron cage” is as much the creation of Talcott Parsons, the
translator of the authoritative (though flawed) English translation of Weber’s thesis, as it is a reflection of
Weber’s original work. Peter Baehr sheds insight into the implications of Parsons’ “iron cage” translation,
and notes that Weber’s original term, stahlhartes Gehäuse, would be more accurately translated into
English as “shell as hard as steel” (Baehr, 154). Parsons’ translation suffices for the purposes of this
analysis (and his use of the “iron cage” metaphor has been endorsed by other Weber translators [ibid.,
157]). It should be noted, however, that Baehr’s translation seems to support the connection between
Weber’s stahlhartes Gehäuse and institutions even more poignantly because, as Baehr notes, steel is both a
modern creation and is a creation of man (as opposed iron, which is a natural element) just as capitalist
institutions are both modern and manmade (ibid., 161-2). Furthermore, whereas a cage can be opened,
Baehr continues, a shell offers no such avenue of escape, further emphasizing the binding nature of the
state in which modern, industrialized, capitalist man lives (ibid., 163-4). If anything, the original German is
even more indicative of how Weber believed the institutions particular to capitalism were virtually
inescapable.
28
PE, 181.
27

22
provided by North, who sees the constant potential for change and reform –thus, there
exists no “iron cage” in North’s conception of institutions. Regardless, the metaphor
highlights my point that both authors understand institutions in terms of the constraints
they place on individuals and groups. In the next chapter, I will touch on the manner in
which these constraints influence incentive structures in Weber’s analysis.
Weber makes it clear that he understands modern capitalism in terms of the
constraints it places upon humans, their identities and their choices. Next, I will address
how individuals respond to these constraints and how these responses influence
institutional changes.
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CHAPTER II
AN INSTITUTIONS THEORY INTERPRETATION OF WEBER’S THESIS
I will now address the issue of human behavior having established that Weber, like North
after him, recognizes all humans –and certainly those of Reformation and postReformation Europe– as living under the influence of institutional constraints. In doing
so, I will provide an explanation of Weber’s thesis in terms of the effects of cost and
changing incentives on Europeans’ decisions to engage in capitalistic behavior.
North offers an eloquent model for better understanding how human decisions are
made given two fundamentals in the previous chapter: institutions are pervasive and
humans assess information subjectively.
The evidence we have with respect to ideologies, altruism, and self-imposed standards of
conduct suggests that the trade-off between wealth and these other values is a negatively
sloped function. That is, where the price to individuals of being able to express their own
values and interests is low, they will loom large in the choices made; but where the price
one pays for expressing one’s own ideology, or norms, or preferences is extremely high,
they will account much less for human behavior… institutions basically alter the price
individuals pay and hence lead to ideas, ideologies, and dogmas frequently playing a
major role in the choices individuals make.29

Thus, the nature of institutional constraints can dictate to what extent subjective
conceptions of the world influence the decisions people make. This is the case because
institutions alter cost structures and, it follows, alter the burden of risk –be it financial,
social, or even spiritual– one takes upon him- or herself when committing to a given
decision or action. As discussed below, it is this observation that sheds light on Weber’s
thesis: the Protestant Reformation and the ensuing changes, as described by Weber, can
be cogently explained in terms of changing costs. This explanation provides convincing
insight into the mechanisms of change which are not explicitly identified by Weber.
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Since Weber is concerned with the impact of religious phenomena on economic
behavior, North’s assertion that beliefs matter is especially pertinent. Some simple
illustrations highlight the intuitive veracity of North’s emphasis on the importance of cost
in relation to ideas, ideologies, and beliefs. For instance, take a religious individual under
a strictly secular totalitarian regime. The regime persecutes religious groups and
individuals, and that this persecution takes place is well known to the state’s citizens.
Here, we see that the cost of free religious expression is high because of the threat of
persecution from the government, and an individual’s daily activities may be better
understood in terms of the environment created by the regime rather than the ideologies
and beliefs of the individual religious insider.
While the individual may privately ascribe to the worldview and cosmology of a
Christian or a Buddhist, the cost of expressing that worldview openly inhibits his or her
ability to choose which worldview –the religion’s or the regime’s– determines decisions
and behaviors on a daily basis. This observation is hardly novel: many 16th century
Spaniards concealed their Jewish or Muslim heritage after the Reconquista, it was not
uncommon for individuals to be hanged for wearing the fez or other Muslim garb during
Atatürk’s rapid secularization of Turkey, citizens did not wear crucifixes in Nazi
Germany or Stalinist Russia, and foreign nationals (few as they may be) do not publicly
carry Hebrew or Christian Bibles in Saudi Arabia. More importantly, in none of these
places could religious insiders openly practice their faith or allow it to affect noticeably
their decision-making without risking persecution.
Contrarily, under a tolerant regime, the cost of expressed religion is low. Here, we
expect a religious insider’s worldview to influence his or her decisions and behavior.
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Where there is low institutionalized cost, as North points out, we can expect religious
worldviews and ideologies to play a greater role in the way decisions are made. Thus, the
potential for ideas, ideologies, and dogmas to play a significant role in decision-making
is an institutional issue, one heavily influenced (though not determined) by institutional
constraints and cost structures. This is one way of understanding “the way institutions
alter the price paid for one’s convictions and hence play a critical role in the extent to
which nonwealth-maximizing motivations influence choices.”30
North acknowledges that these assertions are mainly theoretical, limited by our
incomplete “understanding of motivation.”31 What it may lack in experimental
substantiation, however, it makes up for in theoretical application. North’s assertions
summarized above provide us with a concise interpretation of the institutional
mechanisms behind Weber’s development of the modern capitalist ethos. I will now
illustrate in what ways North’s theory can help us better understand human behavior as
described by Weber and to what extent Weber’s historical account is one of changing
institutional constraints and, more importantly, changing costs. First, I will summarize
Weber’s thesis, highlighting important themes in understanding his argument. Second, I
will apply North’s transaction cost theory of institutions to Weber’s analysis. This
interpretation is the premise upon which the remainder of my analysis is grounded.

i. Weber’s Thesis
Up to this point, I have established that Weber and North share important
assumptions about the world. Since I will now deal with exactly how North can shed light
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on Weber’s argument, it is first important to restate that argument in order to highlight
the most important themes in Weber’s analysis and to clearly present the interpretation of
Weber’s text from which I am deriving my own conclusions. As shown below, I
understand Weber’s thesis in terms of four key themes: rationalization, the idea of the
calling, inner-worldly asceticism,32 and the “ethical foundation” of modern capitalism.
By understanding the relation of these themes to one another, and their relation to
Protestantism and capitalism, the understanding of Weber’s essay upon which this
analysis is grounded becomes clear.
Weber presents the purpose of his analysis in terms of understanding a disparity
between the advancement of Western Europe and the United States when compared to, in
particular, Eastern and African regions. The opening sentence of the essay phrases this in
terms of the observation that certain “cultural phenomena” which possess “universal
significance” are found only in the West.33 Capitalism, “the most fateful force in our
modern life,” characterized by legal and formally established economic exchange, is no
exception to this.34
As explained earlier, Weber not only saw in the process of rationalization a
precipitous increase in the order of society, he also saw in it a recession of religious
mysticism (specifically, the recession of magic in human beliefs) and then religion in
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general. He saw religion and rationalization as ensnared in a constant struggle, noting that
rationalization was often “obstructed by spiritual obstacles.”35
Weber deals with these issues more fully in works such as The Sociology of Religion,
but it is worth noting here to better understand why Weber afforded religion such a
prominent role in his understanding of historical development. Paradoxical as it may
sound, religion simultaneously served as both an obstacle and an impetus for
rationalization. And it is because “The magical and religious forces, and the ethical ideas
of duty based upon them, have in the past always been among the most important
formative influences on conduct,” that Weber decides to explore “the influence of certain
religious ideas on the development of an economic spirit, or the ethos of an economic
system.”36
I will not embark on a defense of Weber’s decision to focus on religion here. In fact,
the decision warrants little defense: Weber’s assertion that religion has had a profound
influence on human behavior is self-evident from even the most superficial survey of
Western history from late-antiquity onward. There were, no doubt, other important forces
of change –changing technology and the development of ethno-national identities quickly
come to mind– but Weber never denies the significance of any of these forces. As I will
address in the next chapter, Weber explicitly rejects any historical analysis that frames
development and change in terms of a single paramount force.37
With this established, Weber proceeds with an analysis of religious and social
developments that focus on the Protestant Reformation, its leaders (Luther and Calvin in
particular), and the emergence of certain religious tenets that contributed to the
35

PE, 26.
PE, 27. Emphasis in original.
37
See PE, 90-1, 183.
36

28
development of a capitalist ethic. What Weber identified as the distinctly Protestant idea
of the “calling,” in which an individual believed that his or her vocation was the divine
will of God and, in some cases, an indication of God’s favor or disfavor, was the most
significant of these tenets. Weber saw in the calling a religious vehicle through which the
modern capitalist ethic –characterized by the pursuit of gain for its own sake– could take
root in European society. These roots were strong enough, Weber continues, that they
outlived the religious context that created them and became a modern capitalist ethic in
themselves. Weber understood this as a gradual development, one that solidified well
after and, in some ways, in spite of leaders such as Luther, Calvin, and Knox.38
The notions of the calling and inner-worldly asceticism are inextricably intertwined in
Weber’s essay. The momentous reform sparked by Luther’s theology, according to
Weber, is due to Luther’s assertion that “The only way of living acceptably to God was
not to surpass worldly morality in monastic asceticism, but solely through the fulfilment
of the obligations imposed upon the individual by his position in the world. That was his
calling.”39 Thus, the idea of the calling not only obligates a Protestant believer to pursue
his or her craft with religious zeal, but it also explicitly rejects the world-rejecting
asceticism of Catholicism that found its strongest voice in Augustine and was practiced in
many Catholic monasteries. This is what makes up inner-worldly asceticism according to
Weber.
Weber sees a stark contrast between Protestant and Catholic worldviews, the former
developing a world-embracing theology while the latter remained world-rejecting.40 The

38

PE, 45.
PE, 80.
40
It should be noted that Weber, himself, acknowledges that this distinction between Catholics and
Protestants, in which the two groups are treated as if they have no internal diversity, is a gross
39

29
product of the Reformation –though only after a significant period of time and not
directly credited to Luther41– is an entire population of Christians who believe that it is
their duty to realize their greatest potential of prosperity and success in their given,
divinely-ordained craft. Here we can see the implicit connection between a religious tenet
and a secular, capitalist ethic. Driven by religious motivation and beliefs, one’s vocation
was given a newfound, rationalized systemization and method (inner-worldly asceticism)
the likes of which had never been seen; this, in turn, was carried over into the efficient
systems of modern capitalism.
Weber believes that the division of labor and specialization, defining characteristics
of modern capitalism, are the result of “historical developments” independent of the
Reformation. When he notes “The specialization of occupations leads, since it makes the
development of skill possible, to a quantitative and qualitative improvement in
production,” Weber is referring to individuals dedicating themselves to the sustenance of
their community through specialized labor.42 Instead of interpreting the Reformation as
the origin of specialized labor, Weber saw in the calling a novel sanction for this division
of labor. Suddenly, the farmer, the blacksmith, the seamstress, the painter, or the
fisherman no longer reluctantly accepted his or her social and economic standing, but
enthusiastically embraced it.

oversimplification. Nonetheless, he sees it as a necessary cost of pursuing a fruitful analysis and it is clear
that Weber believes there to be an underlying truth in this over-simplification, as he seldom hesitates to
draw contrasts between Protestant and Catholic asceticism as if each were a unified group. See PE, 40-1,
118-120, 153-4.
41
Indeed, Weber notes that Luther explicitly rejected certain hallmarks of modern capitalism, such as
charging interest. See PE, 82-3.
42
See PE, 108-109, 160-1, 174. It should be noted that, with respect to Calvinism, Weber does not assert
that advanced features of capitalist economy, such as monopolies, were endorsed. He asserts that these are
later developments (PE, 179).
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The common laborer now became an instrument of God’s will.43 Most importantly,
this Protestant asceticism systematized labor in a way the world had never known, and in
doing so provided the organizational tools from which a new spirit of modern capitalism
would draw.44 Thus, “it was in the ethic of ascetic Protestantism that [capitalism] first
found a consistent ethical foundation.”45 This ethical foundation was augmented by the
belief that God selected an “elect” who were destined for heaven and that their good
favor was reflected in earthly successes; this was, no doubt, a powerful motivator to
pursue economic success. In the following section, I will argue that this ethical
foundation is, in fact, an institutional sanction.
This largely satisfies Weber’s curiosity and he does not give an in depth discussion of
the way, i.e. the relevant mechanisms, in which this distinctly religious ethic could
somehow transform into one that is secular and capitalist. Weber makes sweeping
statements such as “When the limitation of consumption is combined with this release of
acquisitive activity, the inevitable practice is obvious: accumulation of capital through
ascetic compulsion to save.”46 For Weber, many of the “results” of the new asceticism are
taken as obvious. This is not negligence or naiveté on the part of Weber, but rather an
expression of the way in which Weber thought rationalization (from which he thought the
development of capitalism to be inseparable) and secularization went hand-in-hand.
It is self-evident to Weber that along with the rationalization of capitalism would
come a proportionate recession in religion’s overall influence; it follows that the survival
of the capitalist ethic beyond its religious roots is of little concern to Weber and he
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ascribes it simply to the “secularizing influence of wealth.” Weber was not the first to
acknowledge such an influence. The relationship between religion and wealth had been a
subject of discussion in religious circles for centuries before Weber. Weber notes this in
quoting John Wesley, the founder of Methodism, who stated, “I fear, wherever riches
have increased, the essence of religion has decreased in the same proportion.”47 The
transition between religion and secular ethos, it follows, may have seemed not worth
mentioning to Weber. Weber is satisfied to say that Protestantism was important insofar
as it “favoured the development of a rational bourgeois economic life,” and that “What
the great religious epoch of the seventeenth century bequeathed to its utilitarian successor
was… above all an amazingly good, we may even say a pharisaically good, conscience in
the acquisition of money…”48
This brief summary situates the important themes of Weber’s essay, and I will now
turn my attention to the way in which North’s work can help us better understand them.

ii. The Reformation and Changing Costs
Terms employed by Weber such as “good conscience” or “psychological sanction”
seem to lack substance by modern standards of literature in political science and
economics. It is precisely the purpose of this section to show that these terms, and
Weber’s argument, can substantively be maintained in terms of North’s transaction cost
theory of institutions. It is in this respect that North sheds light on the mechanistic
mysteries of Weber’s compelling and controversial essay.
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At the heart of this effort to reassess the plausibility of Weber’s argument lies North’s
assertion that institutions “determine transaction and transformation costs and hence the
profitability and feasibility of engaging in economic activity.”49 North’s entire analysis
can be understood as a transaction cost theory of institutional change, with risk and costs
being central themes in this theory. Two questions concerning Weber’s essay become
remarkably clear when we supply Weber with the tools of transaction cost analysis that
were unavailable to him during his lifetime: what mechanism gave the Protestant
reformation such potency and impact on an economic level? And how could a religious
ethos survive secularization in the form of a capitalist ethos?
In the remainder of this chapter, I will argue that, according to Weber’s account, the
development of Protestant theology (especially the notion of the calling) led to a
reduction in the cost –in the form of perceived “spiritual risk”– of capitalist gain as
perceived by those who ascribed to Protestant beliefs. While reducing the cost of gain, in
itself, may sound strange, it makes sense in terms of the subjective reality of European
and early American Christians, for whom the cost of pursuing material gain was
manifested both in the way they were perceived by their peers and, more importantly,
what awaited them in the afterlife.
North understands the cost of transaction in terms of two realities of economic life
that he asserts have been neglected by neoclassical theorists: the difficulty of accurate
measurement and the cost of enforcement. For the purpose of this analysis, measurement
is important insofar as it is representative of imperfect information and the subjectivity of
reality. If perceptions conformed perfectly to reality, if inaccurate perception was not a
constant and, in many cases, insurmountable challenge for humans, measurement would
49

North, 118.

33
be a simple matter. The significance of this has already been discussed above in
establishing the ways in which Weber and North have similar conceptions of human
perception.
Of greater concern here is the cost of enforcement and what it implies: namely, the
need for enforcement implies a degree of risk and an attempt, be it formal or informal, to
resolve the challenges of those risks. Risk may come in the form of defection or some
other form of agreement violation. The level of risk, North points out, is an essential
determinant and indicator of institutional success: since institutions reduce uncertainty,
risk levels are low where there are well-developed and advanced institutional matrices.
Enforcement reduces the risk of defection or violation in that it introduces a cost or
punishment for the act of defection itself (in this sense, enforcement also solves problems
of coordination). As North puts it, enforcement curbs “self-interested behavior,” and it
follows that transaction costs in part reflect the level of risk itself.50 While Weber may
have not possessed the vernacular to express the importance of these costs –especially
with respect to risk– they are an essential part of the mechanisms that make his analysis
plausible.
It is important here to reiterate that North’s “transaction cost theory of exchange” is
grounded on the assertion that transaction costs are pervasive and ineluctable. North
makes a strong case for this, noting that the seemingly simple process of measurement is
actually an intricate process requiring insight into many phases of producing a good or
service as well as the individual attributes of that product. Thus, measurement always
brings with it costs. North also notes that “asymmetries of information” affect behavioral
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decisions, contributing to the complicatedness of transaction costs.51 More important for
this analysis is the convincing assertion that transaction costs are pervasive and
ineluctable and that institutions emerge to help individuals and organizations cope with
the demands of this complexity. Thus, “Institutions provide the structure for exchange
that… determines the cost of transacting and the cost of transformation.”52 This is as true
today, according to North, as it has been since the beginning of human economic activity.
It was certainly true during and after Martin Luther touched off the Protestant
Reformation.
Given the subjectivity of reality acknowledged by North, costs do not have to be
“real” in any quantifiable sense in order for them to affect human behavior. Thus, if an
individual or organization makes a sizable investment in a burgeoning economic market,
the quantifiable risk that goes into that investor’s “actual” cost of investing and the risk
that the investor perceives are not necessarily congruent; in fact, they may be grossly
incongruent. Similarly, an individual stockholder may see less risk in investing in a
failing or struggling domestic industry than in investing in a more successful foreign
industry because the stockholder perceives a high risk in (or moral qualm with)
supporting foreign industry over domestic industry. We see this on a regular basis with
Americans who insist on buying American-made automobiles on principle, rather than on
empirical performance measurements. Cost and risk must only be perceived to be real in
the sense that it influences the decisions of an individual or group.
Weber’s subject is a (primarily Western) European population during a time when
Christian religion was one of the most pervasive and influential forces in the European
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social matrix. Few factors influenced the daily lives of common Europeans as much as
religion. Christianity, usually Catholicism before the Reformation, exerted constant
influence on behavior and decision-making. Through theological tenets decided in Rome
and passed on through priests and missionaries, Europeans were given a clear sense of
the repercussions of their behavior. Though national and sectarian differences did occur,
certain fundamentals, such as material gain being identified as sinful, were near
universal. R.H. Tawney, a critic of Weber’s thesis, notes that as Europe entered the
Reformation,
There was no question of progress, still less of any radical social reconstruction… The
official Church, to which independence of thought among the lower orders was but little
less abhorrent when it related to their temporal well-being than when it was concerned
with their eternal salvation, frowned upon these dangerous speculations, and sometimes
crushed them with a ferocity as relentless as the most savage of the White Terrors of
modern history has shown to the most formidable of insurrections.53

Thus, the perceived cost of defecting from dogma or Church creed for many
European Catholics was spiritual, social, and, in some cases, physical. In a soteriological
belief system that said God worked through a meritocracy –rewarding good behavior and
punishing sins– there was little ambiguity about the costs of daily behavior in terms of
whether or not one was putting him or herself at risk of eternal damnation. On a
fundamental level, Weber’s entire analysis is predicated on an assumption of difference
between Catholic and Protestant soteriology,54 and I assert that this difference can be
understood in terms of differing perceptions in the costs of capitalist behavior.
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In terms of cost, much of the stability of the Church’s authority up to the Reformation
was thanks to the individual Christian’s beliefs. As long as the individual Christian
believed that the authority of the Church was tantamount to the authority of God, the
Church’s authority was secure. Persistent beliefs, i.e. “faith in the Church,” kept the cost
of maintaining conformity low (relatively speaking) while the cost of defection was high
because there was the ever-present threat of damnation. Returning to North’s point
quoted at the beginning of this chapter, the willingness of individuals to pursue
preferences, e.g. material gain, is determined by the cost of pursuing said preferences. In
this case, there could be no higher cost for pursuing the goals of “modern capitalism”
than those established before the Reformation. It is understandable that only a historical
development as tumultuous as the Reformation itself could alter the power of such an
institutionalized cost structure.
Since both Catholicism and the various Protestant sects upheld that human actions
brought with them divine consequences, whether directly or as determined by divine
predestination (and thus consequential insofar as actions served as an indicator of God’s
favor), European religious insiders imbued all forms of commercial exchange with a
significant perceived cost. These costs were as influential as they were, in a quantitative

Catholicism rejected materialism or the accumulation of capital while Protestantism endorsed it. In fact,
Catholic Patristic theologians as well as significant Protestant leaders such as Luther and Calvin
condemned what they would call sinful materialism and what most modern Americans would simply call
profit or even success. This gives rise to two important points. First, Weber is not asserting that
Protestantism endorsed capitalistic behavior, but that it provided a new psychological sanction (and as I put
it, reduced the cost) that led to widespread capitalist behavior. Second, Weber is clear that modern
capitalism was an unintended consequence of the Reformation (see PE, 89-90), so it is not necessary to his
argument that Protestantism “endorsed materialism more” than Catholicism, only that it changed attitudes
such that a capitalist ethos could emerge. This is why Weber notes that the ethics of capitalism did not
originate in Protestantism, but that, in Protestantism, capitalism “found a consistent ethical foundation”
(PE, 170-1).
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sense, intangible. That is to say, Europeans perceived a spiritual and social cost55 that
came capitalistic behavior. Thus, Weber claims that the Reformation changed attitudes
instead of giving birth to capitalism: “The effect of the Reformation as such was only
that, as compared with the Catholic attitude, the moral emphasis on and the religious
sanction of, organized worldly labour in a calling was mightily increased.”56 This resulted
in marginal changes leading to a generally permissive attitude towards the pursuit of
profit, which stood in stark contrast to the condemnation of such pursuits in PreReformation Europe.
If we assume that individuals and organizations respond to changing costs in a way so
as to minimize the costs they incur, then the increase in capitalist activity which Weber
ascribes to the Reformation is not only plausible, but also expected.57 The idea of the
calling, as Weber illustrates, created a newfound enthusiasm for vocational success, and
on a continent undergoing a process of labor specialization, the pursuit of success, both
through personal achievement and interpersonal exchange, proliferated under the
permission (and even encouragement) of new theological tenets. These changes
constitute a change in the costs of exchange for Reformation-era and post-Reformation
Christians: the sanctions of the calling were simultaneously a duty or obligation to the
Protestant for a certain kind of behavior and a reduction in the cost of that behavior.
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The idea of the calling directly translates into a reduction of cost because it reduces
the burden of spiritual risk in engaging in capitalist activity. Unfettered by the fear of
repercussions in the afterlife, Protestants could engage in the rationalized labor described
by Weber at a lower perceived cost than ever before. Capitalism demands that attention
be paid to worldly activity; Weber explains that, prior to the Reformation,
…the most important thing was the fact that the man who, par excellence, lived a rational
life in the religious sense was, and remained, alone the monk. Thus asceticism, the more
strongly it gripped an individual, simply served to drive him farther away from everyday
life, because the holiest task was definitely to surpass all worldly morality.58

From such a worldview, the cost of engaging in worldly capitalism is unacceptably high.
Inner-worldly asceticism offered a mode of thought through which the cost of capitalist
activity was reduced to a more acceptable level for the average European Protestant.
Though gradual, the changes initiated by the Reformation were momentous. While
North does not address such a phenomenon, belief in an omnipotent deity in a context
heavily influenced by religion can have the effect of efficient enforcement between
multiple parties, one of which being the believer and another being the godhead (who, in
the Abrahamic religions, is both member to and enforcer of religious covenant). As in all
the Abrahamic religions, the Christian godhead was considered omnipotent and
omniscient. This has powerful psychological ramifications. Just as most modern
Americans are prone not to steal for fear of legal punishment,59 European Christians
during and after the time of Luther were taught to fear repercussions in their afterlife
from a God who punished sin.60
Before the Reformation, dedicating oneself to his or her craft for the sake of profit
came with a high spiritual cost: even if one could doggedly pursue a given craft, they
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could not avoid the omniscient enforcement of the deity. As Weber acknowledges, this
was a powerful psychological factor keeping modern capitalism at bay. It is argued below
that while Protestantism did not eliminate this cost structure –after all, Protestants did not
reject the existence of an omnipotent and omniscient God– it had the effect of greatly
reducing costs with respect to capitalistic behavior. That is to say, combined with
secularization, the Reformation established a cost matrix in which modern capitalism
could develop.
So what exactly changed? While Weber denies that modern capitalism could have
emerged only as a direct result of the Protestant Reformation,61 he clearly believes that it
played a significant role in motivating change. Weber explains this in terms of an ideal
–the calling– rather than in terms of mechanisms that altered institutional matrices. Using
North’s theory of costs, however, we gain better insight into these unexpressed
mechanisms. As Protestantism gained increasing momentum, Catholicism and
Protestantism became competing institutions, the former asserting the cost structure
described above while the latter offered a contrasting cost structure, one that asserted that
the avoidance of worldly vocational obligations (the same sort of avoidance endorsed by
Catholic dogma) brought with it the equivalent punishment of damnation in the form of
not being granted predestined salvation, i.e. being a member of the “elect.”
With the spread of Protestantism, the cost structure was altered such that the cost of
engaging in restricted capitalistic exchange was dramatically reduced because it no
longer carried with it the burden of risking damnation. I say “restricted,” as opposed to
unfettered or free, here because Weber is careful to note that Protestant leaders such as
Calvin opposed the capitalistic pursuit of gain for its own sake, even if they helped it
61
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grow in Europe and America: “We cannot well maintain that the pursuit of worldly
goods, conceived as an end in itself, was to any of them of positive ethical value.”62 Thus,
when I assert that Protestantism lowered the costs of capitalistic exchange, I mean it in an
prolonged sense –Protestantism led to a reduction in the cost of modern capitalistic
behavior, but not immediately.
Given enough time, these cost reductions could also lead to the creation of new
incentive structures, according to Weber’s account. The idea of the calling, as noted
above, reduced the cost and risk of engaging in capitalistic activities, making it a newly
viable alternative form of behavior for Christians living in a European context in which
technology was advancing and labor was becoming more specialized. In assessing
“practical pastoral work,” Weber also notes that the reduced costs associated with
capitalistic behavior were imbued with new incentives for engaging in such behavior.
Weber explains that when faced with the spiritual loneliness of Calvinism, pastors and
preachers reinterpreted Protestant beliefs in order to make the Protestant message less
fatalistic. One of the ways of accomplishing this was for the individual believer to
assumer his or her own predestined salvation, and then live his or her life accordingly:
“The exhortation of the apostle to make fast one’s own call is here interpreted as a duty to
attain certainty of one’s own election and justification in the daily struggle of life.”63 The
practical result of this is an incentive for pursuing vocational success as a means of
confirming one’s salvation. North explains that this relationship between costs and
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incentives is to be expected given that incentives are “imbedded” in institutional
constraints.64
Here we see the implications of unintended consequences at work –something which
I discuss in greater detail in Chapter IV. New interpretations of the Protestant message,
according to Weber, supplemented the reduced cost discussed above with incentives to
take one’s vocation seriously and pursue it rigorously, that reason being earthly success
as an indication of divine grace. Thus, cost is not the only factor at work here –though I
assert it is the primary factor to consider– because it brought with it the creation of new
incentives to engage in capitalist activity that previously did not exist.

iii. Religion as an Institutional Force
The description above of the changes generated by the Reformation is only a
summary. The process was, after all, a gradual development rather than a sudden shift in
institutional dominance or cost structure.65 Weber understands this development in terms
of the following stages: Luther’s initiation, theological and ethical appropriation by
Calvin and other Protestant sects, and the rise of a secular capitalist ethos (in which
Weber believed English Protestant sects played an especially important role). Weber
leaves the last of these stages largely unexplained, drawing similarities between religious
and capitalist ethos rather than elucidating how one precipitated or affected the other. I
will attempt to fill in some of these gaps.
Weber ascribes a new interpretation and sanction of the calling to Luther, but he does
not credit Luther with creating the modern spirit of capitalism: “…it is hardly necessary
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to point out that Luther cannot be claimed for the spirit of capitalism in the sense in
which we have used that term… or for that matter in any sense whatever.” Overall,
Weber interprets Luther as highly “traditionalistic” and believes that his views on usury
and interest were “from a capitalistic view-point, definitely backward.”66 Thus, it is clear
that Weber believed the development of a spirit of capitalism to be a later development,
one that was better ascribed to Luther’s successors than to the father of the Reformation
himself. Luther, it follows, did not have a direct impact on the changes in cost described
above.
Weber points to Calvinism as the true herald (though not the advocate) of the
capitalist ethos: “Although the Reformation is unthinkable without Luther’s own personal
religious development… without Calvinism his work could not have had permanent
concrete success.”67 Calvinism marked the first dramatic shift in reducing the perceived
risks of engaging in what would later be characterized as capitalist behavior. Weber lays
out two simple assumptions advocated by Calvinist pastors, both of which have the effect
of reducing the cost of pursuing economic gain or success while providing incentives for
such pursuits. The two assumptions go as follows:
On the one hand it is held to be an absolute duty to consider oneself chosen, and to combat all
doubts as temptations of the devil, since lack of self-confidence is the result of insufficient faith,
hence imperfect grace… On the other hand, in order to attain that self-confidence intense worldly
activity is recommended as the most suitable means. It and it alone disperses religious doubts and
gives the certainty of grace.68

In the same way that Catholic theology created a high price for pursuing material
gain, Calvinism created an equivalent high price for avoiding material success (though
not for its own sake). Neglecting one’s material obligations meant watching one’s own
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salvation slip away. And while Calvinism did not endorse the modern capitalist pursuit of
gain for its own sake, the reduction in cost upon which modern capitalism grew was
established. Weber explains the theological sanction for such a cost reduction: “For if that
God, whose hand the Puritan sees in all occurrences of life, shows one of his elect a
chance at profit, he must do it with a purpose.”69
North’s theory would predict that freely sanctioned material gain would spread with
the growth of Calvinism and similar theological teachings since the reduction in the cost
of such gain and the theology of Calvinism were inseparable. Other Protestant sects, such
as the Pietists and the Methodists, traveled this path farther still. Weber saw the
rationalism of Calvinism as the culprit behind spreading the groundwork for capitalism,70
but the mechanism behind this rationalization –only implicitly expressed by Weber– was
a reduction in perceived costs.
This institutional cost interpretation of Weber’s thesis also yields insight into the very
nature of an “ethic” or “ethos” for Weber. I return to a quote already mentioned above,71
in which Weber explains that what distinguishes modern capitalism from its capitalist
predecessors is “a peculiar ethic.” Weber continues, “The infraction of its rules is treated
not as foolishness but as forgetfulness of duty.” Here we see that the modern capitalist
ethic possesses two traits: the ethic is binding and it does not elicit contemplative
reflection or consideration. The first of these traits is implied by use of the word “duty,”
implying obligation. This is reminiscent of the binding nature of institutions described by
North: while it is possible to change institutions, they nonetheless constrain our ability to
act and behave in certain ways through both formal and informal constraints. The
69
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constraints, in turn, also create incentives. In this sense, individuals, as inhabitants of an
economic world, are bound to oblige these institutional constraints to the extent that
individuals or groups do not have the capability or initiative to change the institutional
matrix. These institutions become our “duty.” The second trait, that adhering to these
constraints is a thoughtless, even instinctual act, is implied by the fact that violating an
institutional constraint is not “foolish” (for how can one be unaware of a duty that is
pervasive and of which one is constantly reminded?) but “forgetful,” implying that one is
simply neglecting what should be thoughtless or non-contemplative.
Thus, what Weber describes as the ethic of modern capitalism is no different from
what North describes as a system of institutional informal constraints, constraints that are
binding and simultaneously as obvious to those who live under them as they are noncontemplative. Where Weber writes, “it was in the ethic of ascetic Protestantism that
[capitalism] first found a consistent ethical foundation,”72 we can now read as “it was in
the institutions of ascetic Protestantism that capitalism first found a consistent
institutional foundation.” Weber is referring to a specific set of institutional structures,
which he identifies as a capitalist ethos. In other words, though he did not possess the
analytic tools to express it in the beginning of the twentieth-century, Weber is proposing
an institutions theory argument for the development of modern capitalism.
What remains to be explained is the final product: a secularized spirit of capitalism,
most fully realized in the United States, according to Weber.73 Already we have seen that
Weber’s conception of the influence of religion can be understood in terms of reducing
the cost of capitalist behavior. But how could this cost reduction shed the religious
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components with which it was founded? North offers the answer that the capitalist kernel
in the religious shell could persist despite secularization because of the nature of
interaction between institutions and organizations and the importance of costs. North
stipulates early in his analysis that
Institutions, together with the standard constraints of economic theory, determine the
opportunities in a society. Organizations are created to take advantage of those
opportunities, and, as the organizations evolve, they alter the institutions. The resultant
path of institutional change is shaped by (I) the lock-in that comes from the symbiotic
relationship between institutions and the organizations that have evolved as a
consequence of the incentive structure provided by those institutions and (2) the feedback
process by which human beings perceive and react to changes in the opportunity set.74

The discussion above has been focused on this “feedback process” whereby
Europeans reacted to the new opportunity set of lower costs created by Protestant
theology. Organizations most likely played a role in these developments as well. The
Reformation was coincidental with the specialization of labor in Europe and the rise of
organizations implied by the specialization of labor, such as guilds. According to North,
these organizations would serve as the carriers of the Protestant ethic into a new, secular
context. Most important of all, the loosening of constraints on capitalistic behavior
allowed these organizations to utilize labor and capital in a way that was previously
unacceptable on the individual and organizational levels. That is to say, they were able to
mobilize for profit more than ever before, leaving industries of sustenance behind.
By developing in regions where the idea of the calling and inner-worldly asceticism
were prevalent, organization would gain a vested interest in the systematic and
rationalized labor that proliferated under the theological permission of Protestant thought.
Technological advancements evolving beyond cottage industry organization was, no
doubt, significant in these developments. The Protestant ethic, however, provided the
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ethical framework from which many organizations could first experiment with capitalist
exchange on a wide scale. Below, I discuss the importance of this permitted
experimentation, as it is central to the question of why the Reformation? Similarly, we
can now understand Weber’s observations concerning rationalization in terms of cost and
organizations: theological aspects of the Reformation reduced the cost of capitalist
behavior and organizations pursued the opportunity for new gains. The rationalization of
labor and, from this, society was subsequently accelerated.
It should be emphasized that according to North’s theory these organizations would
have emerged in response to the ethical changes already noted above. Thus, the most
significant change brought on by the Reformation was the reduction in cost that has been
the focus of this analysis; organizations played a secondary role by gaining from the
potential advantages of this “ethical foundation.” The secondary role of organizations in
this sense is determined by the fact that the Reformation created new sanctions not just
on an organizational level, but also on an individualistic and personal level. Thus, the
point that Weber emphasizes is that the Reformation brought a new order to daily life for
the individual. Any repercussions this may have had on the way organizations functioned
would have been a consequence of this new order.
Weber makes a convincing argument that by initiating a reduction in costs of
engaging in capitalist activity, the institutional structures we now identify as capitalistic
could survive the secularization of the Enlightenment and industrialization through the
collective endorsement of organizations that benefited from the (eventually) unfettered
sanctions initially generated by the idea of the calling. If the Reformation reduced costs
of capitalist exchange, as has been argued above, then the Reformation created an
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opportunity set in which relatively (that is, relative to earlier periods) unfettered capitalist
exchange was an option. It is wholly feasible that incremental changes in Europe’s many
institutions could eliminate components of the original appearance of this institutional
matrix while retaining others. Indeed, the recession of religion in Europe would only
enhance the cost-reducing effects the Reformation had created by further eroding the
restrictions of religious dogma. That “the religious roots died out slowly, giving way to
utilitarian worldliness”75 will be given greater attention in Chapter IV, where I will
further explain how costs, discussed above, are especially important in understanding the
institutional stability described by Weber and institutional stability in general.
The Reformation was not a necessary condition for the emergence of a capitalist
ethic, but it is reasonable to assert that it had a significant influence on the development
of capitalism. Indeed, religion may not have been the most efficient lens through which a
capitalist vision could come into focus, but North reminds us that history is not
determined by efficiency. If history works through path-dependence, and “history is
always derived from past history,”76 it should come as no surprise that “one side of the
causal change”77 might lie in the momentous changes of the Protestant Reformation. This
possibility is, after all, the whole of what Weber suggests: in explicit opposition to
Marx’s historical materialism, the conclusion of Weber’s essay invites further analysis of
the phenomenon, not a final word.
The plausibility of a persistent phenomenon like the capitalist ethic emerging from
the Reformation is further enhanced by the decentralizing effect of the Reformation itself.
The diversity of the Protestant sects, as opposed to a singular, unified Catholic Church, in
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itself, increased the likelihood that a persistent institutional structure might emerge. North
explains that this is a simple matter of probability:
The society that permits the maximum generation of trials will be most likely to solve
problems through time… Adaptive efficiency, therefore, provides the incentives to
encourage the development of decentralized decision-making processes that will allow
societies to maximize the efforts required to explore alternative ways of solving
problems.78

The dramatic changes initiated by the Reformation allowed for a process of trial and
error that was less likely under the purview of a unified Catholic Church. This is, no
doubt, part of the reason why so many significant religious leaders emerged during the
Reformation. It would be incorrect to describe the Reformation as a period of unrelenting
free thought; quite the contrary, the Reformation introduced elaborate systems of
constraint. Nonetheless, authority over theological ideas was less centrally regulated
during the Reformation than it was under Catholic authority. This does not explain the
relationship between capitalism and the Reformation, but it does explain why the
phenomena described above were more likely to occur during or after the Reformation
that prior to it.
To summarize, the Reformation provided the reduction in costs that allowed for
experimentation in capitalist exchange. This, in turn, led to organizations gaining an
interest in the maintenance of this exchange. Secularization eroded the religious traits of
this institutional matrix, but did not affect this vested interest. This marks the first insight
into the persistence of capitalist institutions beyond the Reformation, an issue I explore
more fully in Chapter IV. The Reformation can thus be understood as a significant period
of cost reduction in the larger process of rationalization, which was Weber’s primary
concern. Since capitalism is, no doubt, one of the most influential and significant forces
78
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in the rationalization process, any reduction in the cost of behavior associated with
capitalism is a de facto accelerator of rationalization itself.
Such a cost reduction –if, in fact, this is what the Reformation amounted to–
proved so successful that it persisted long after the religious fervor of the era had faded
away. Weber’s “iron cage,” in more modern parlance, is best described as an entrenched
or stable institutional structure. I will now turn my attention to a reflection on the
significance of these conclusions with respect to the continued relevance of Weber’s
analysis. I will address both Weber’s critics and what Weber and North, considered
together, tell us about our understanding of history and the present.
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CHAPTER III
RESPONDING TO WEBER’S CRITICS
Before addressing the lessons of this interpretation of Weber’s thesis, it is necessary to
address Weber’s critics so as to substantiate that continued analysis of the thesis is
worthwhile to begin with, having not been disproved or invalidated. It is well beyond the
scope of this analysis to adequately survey and address all of the criticisms of Weber’s
thesis –even addressing the major criticisms would be a lengthy task in itself.79 Perhaps
the most widely used criticism of Weber’s thesis is that it does not provide nearly enough
evidence to support its ambitious claims. This was the standpoint of Felix Rachfahl, who
first commented on Weber’s thesis in 1909 and was one The Protestant Ethic’s earliest
critics.80 Rachfahl’s criticisms are some of the most significant to address by virtue of his
being an early respondent to Weber’s work and, as Kurt Samuelsson notes, most of his
criticisms have been repeated by later critics in one form or another.81

i. Felix Rachfahl
Rachfahl’s commentary is a worthwhile place to start, and Samuelsson cogently
summarizes Rachfahl’s criticisms as follows: 1. Rachfahl found the idea of an “ethicalreligious motivation” for modern capitalism dubious at best, noting that there could have
been any number of other factors “motivating” the growth of modern capitalism; 2.
Calvin’s theology made strict restrictions on economic activity, implying that to associate
79
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the theologian or his theology with any form of capitalism is misrepresentative; 3.
Rachfahl accused Weber of exaggerating the dissimilarity between Protestantism and
Catholicism, pointing to the Benedictines, Franciscans, and Jesuits as exemplary of
blending capitalism and asceticism; and 4. Rachfahl asserted that Weber’s geographical
focus on Northern Europe is misleading, noting that (primarily southern) Catholic regions
also enjoyed the advances of a burgeoning modern capitalism.82 These are all worthwhile
criticisms of Weber’s work, and the theoretical argument of Chapter II allows us to
address some, though not all, of these points.
The first criticism noted above is most relevant to this analysis, as it is most within
the scope of my theoretical assertions to address it (though this is not to imply that
Rachfahl’s other objections are less worthy of attention). Rachfahl, emphasizing that
Weber’s claims were unsubstantiated, saw Weber’s connection between religion and a
newfound capitalist motivation as arbitrarily drawn: why, asked Rachfahl, could not the
motivation be ascribed to “the desire to enjoy life,” “the urge to work for one’s fellowman, for the common good, for the nation and its welfare”?83 In other words, Weber’s
connection between religion and a new “ethic” is arbitrary according to Rachfahl. I offer
three rebuttals to this, one of Rachfahl’s sharpest criticisms. The first is directly from
Weber’s response to Rachfahl, the second can be found in The Protestant Ethic itself, and
the third can be inferred from the insights provided by North above.
In his reply to Rachfahl, Weber points out that he never draws a connection between
advanced economic systems and Protestantism, only between the spirit of capitalism and
religion: “I myself call it ‘foolish’ to imply that it would be possible to derive the
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capitalist economic system from religious motives in general or from the work ethic of
what I called ‘ascetic’ Protestantism.” Weber further notes that even this connection is
only one of many possible factors contributing to the modern spirit of capitalism: “It did
not occur to me to identify those motives I believed were originally religiously
determined and ‘of ascetic character’ with the capitalist spirit… I portray them only as
one constitutive element among others of this ‘spirit’ (and constitutive of other features
of modern culture as well!).”84
Thus, Weber responded to Rachfahl by asserting that Rachfahl credits The Protestant
Ethic with claims loftier than Weber, himself, made. Weber does, in fact, temper his
argument at many points throughout the essay, and he consistently refuses to identify
Protestantism as the crucial factor in the development of modern capitalism. As quoted
earlier, Weber calls his analysis “only one side of the causal chain.” More importantly, he
closes the analysis by criticizing Marx’s theory of historical materialism and asserting
that “… it is, of course, not my aim to substitute for a one-sided materialistic an equally
one-sided spiritualistic causal interpretation of culture and of history.”85 Justifiable as
they may be, however, these responses only answer Rachfahl’s criticism with further
criticism by turning the tables on the critic. Weber is, in essence, accusing Rachfahl of
improper criticism by asserting that Rachfahl is simply trying to explain what he would
have done differently with Weber’s analysis. The insights provided by North allow for a
fuller, more direct response to what Rachfahl considers a dubious connection between
religion and economic motivation.
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Rachfahl criticized Weber for not providing enough evidence to draw a causal
relationship between religion and a burgeoning capitalist ethos, and for failing to specify
to what degree religion influenced the development of capitalism.86 Later scholars echoed
Rachfahl in criticizing the lack of evidence in Weber’s thesis, but such a criticism ignores
Weber’s closing sentence, in which he clearly states that he never intended to make an
exhaustive analysis, only to provide the intellectual impetus for further analysis.
Rachfahl is guilty of weighing Weber’s thesis against standards that go far beyond the
text’s intentions instead of weighing the thesis against the goals stated throughout
Weber’s analysis. Nonetheless, the previous chapter of this analysis has shown that, in
theory, a causal mechanism relating the Reformation to the spread of modern capitalism
is possible in that religious beliefs could reduce the costs of individuals and organizations
engaging in activities associated with the capitalism. That is to say, it has been
demonstrated that a) beliefs matter, b) that subjective perceptions affect perceived costs,
and that c) beliefs can cause the reduction in costs implied in Weber’s thesis. More
specifically, it has been shown that Reformation theology, in particular and combined
with the Reformation’s decentralization of Western Christianity, could create an ideal
environment in which capitalist behavior could flourish.
Nor is Weber the only thinker to have drawn a connection between religion and the
development of capitalism. R.H. Tawney, in the 1937 preface to his critique of Weber’s
thesis, wrote that
It is an illusion to suppose that [Weber] stands alone in pointing to a connection between
the religious movements of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries and the outburst of
economic energy which was remaking society in the Netherlands and England. Other
students have reached, independently of him, that not recondite conclusion.87
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A significant criticism of Weber’s thesis came from Werner Sombart, whose The Jews
and Modern Capitalism (Die Juden und das Wirtschaftsleben) bears important
similarities with Weber’s thesis, such as an idea of capitalism grounded in rationality and
an emphasis on a religious ethos, the “Jewish spirit.”88 Sombart’s work is more
exhaustive than Weber’s, but it nonetheless places a religious group at the center of the
development of an economic phenomenon. And, like Weber, Sombart does not hesitate to
acknowledge “There were undoubtedly a thousand and one other causes that helped to
make the economic system of our time what it is.”89 Sombart further agreed that modern
capitalism was the result of a specific “spirit,” though he found the roots of this spirit in
Jewish Europeans rather than Protestantism.90
More recently, Rodney Stark has turned to Christianity in explaining the
developmental disparity between the West and other regions. Conspicuously reminiscent
of Weber introduction, Stark begins his analysis by asking,
Why was it that although many civilizations had pursued alchemy, it led to chemistry
only in Europe? Why was it that, for centuries, Europeans were the only ones possessed
of eyeglasses, chimneys, reliable clocks, heavy cavalry, or a system of music notation?
How had nations that had arisen from barbarism and the rubble of fallen Rome so greatly
surpassed the rest of the world?91

Stark argues not that Christianity alone gave rise to modern capitalism, but that the most
important “victories” leading up to capitalism occurred in distinctly Christian settings.92
Gordon Marshall’s Presbyteries and Profits: Calvinism and the Development of
Capitalism in Scotland, 1560-1707 most clearly executes Weber’s “wishes,” laid out at
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the end of The Protestant Ethic, for other scholars to further explore the connection
between Protestantism and capitalism.
That other authors have “carried the torch,” so to speak, after Weber does not validate
Weber’s thesis or invalidate Rachfahl’s criticism. It does, however, show that the
possible causal relationship between religion and the development of capitalism has
withstood tremendous scrutiny without being wholly debunked. This by no means proves
that there was such a connection, but we can see that where Rachfahl saw an arbitrary
and superficial connection being drawn, there may have been something substantive.
Finally, the insights provided by North in Chapter II of this analysis show that the
significant changes precipitated by the Reformation can be cogently understood using an
institutions theory approach to the period, especially in understanding how costs may
have affected widespread changes in capitalistic behavior. It has been shown above that
this change in cost can be logically traced through the changes in belief that arose from
the revolutionary theology of Reformation theologians. Contrary to Rachfahl’s criticism,
Weber’s connection no longer seems arbitrary because it provides a mechanism for
institutional change.
Rachfahl’s second criticism, that Weber does not make clear to what extent the
Reformation influenced the development of capitalism, highlights a shortcoming of this
analysis, namely that it is not my intention to supplement Weber’s thesis with additional
historical evidence. North’s institutions model only allows us to reassess the plausibility
of Weber’s argument, and since Weber does not offer an explanation of the precise
degree to which the Reformation influenced capitalism, reading his analysis through an
institutions theory lens cannot shed further insight. Nonetheless, it is clear that Weber

56
believed religion to play a significant, perhaps the most significant, role in the
development of modern capitalism.
Rachfahl’s remaining criticisms lead us to what is perhaps the most compelling
rebuttal to Weber’s thesis: capitalism existed before the Reformation. His questioning
Weber’s interpretation of Calvinism, asserting that Catholics exhibited capitalistic
behavior outside of Protestant influence, and questioning Weber’s geographical focus all
ask if modern capitalism already existed under Catholic rule.

ii. The Implications of Catholic Capitalism
Tawney is a notable critic of Weber who applied the argument that capitalism
predates the Reformation. Tawney accuses Weber of one-sided selection bias in drawing
his conclusions:
Religion influenced, to a degree which to-day is difficult to appreciate, men’s outlook of
society. Economic and social changes acted powerfully on religion. Weber, as was
natural in view of his special interests, emphasized the first point… He touched the
second point only en passant.93

It is clear, however, that Weber does not see the relationship between religion and
capitalism to be unidirectional. Weber characterizes “the whole history of monasticism”
as “a continual struggle with the problem of the secularizing influence of wealth,” and, as
noted earlier, quotes John Wesley as being particularly fearful of this struggle.94 Thus, it
is clear that Weber recognized that the interaction between religion and capitalism was
one of reciprocal influence. True, he emphasized the influence of religion on the
development of capitalism because it was the subject of his analysis, but this in no way
means that Weber denied that the relationship between economics and religion was
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reciprocal as Tawney suggests. Understanding Weber’s thesis in terms of perceived costs
as explained by North clarifies that Weber recognized this reciprocity: the very nature of
the institutional structures recognized by Weber suggests that religion would be
influenced by the economic institutions that emerged as a result of the Reformation.
Thus, it came as no surprise to Weber that the capitalist ethos with religious roots became
a force of secularization: just as religion influenced economic behavior, subsequent
economic behavior influenced religion.
Tawney offers a broad historical analysis that leads him to the conclusion that modern
economic systems are best explained in terms of “the contraction of the territory within
which the spirit of religion was conceived to run.”95 In other words, Tawney believes
secularization was the true force of change. Tawney points to a haphazard process of
secularization and intellectualization in explaining the growth of capitalism; his distaste
for Weber’s thesis clearly stems from evidence that capitalism predates the Reformation
and that the theologians such as Luther and Calvin were not concerned with the
intellectual discourse that that helped capitalism spread.96 Because it so cogently captures
the debate initiated by scholars such as Rachfahl, I quote Tawney in full:
If capitalism means the direction of industry by the owners of capital for their own
pecuniary gain, and the social relationships which establish themselves between them and
the wage-earning proletariat whom they control, then capitalism had existed on a grand
scale both in medieval Italy and in medieval Flanders. If by the capitalist spirit is meant
the temper which is prepared to sacrifice all moral scruples to the pursuit of profit, it had
been only too familiar to the saints and sages of the Middle Ages. It was the economic
imperialism of Catholic Portugal and Spain, not the less imposing, if more solid,
achievements of the Protestant powers, which impressed contemporaries down to the
Armada. It was predominantly Catholic cities which were the commercial capitals of
Europe, and Catholic bankers who were its leading financiers.
…If it is true that the Reformation released forces which were to act as a solvent of
the traditional attitude of religious thought to social and economic issues, it did so
without design, and against the intention of most reformers. In reality, however
sensational the innovations in economic practice which accompanied the expansion of
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financial capitalism in the sixteenth century, the development of doctrine on the subject
of economic ethics was continuous, and, the more closely it is examined, the less
foundation does there seem to be for the view that the stream plunged into vacancy over
the precipice of the religious revolution. To think of the abdication of religion from its
theoretical primacy over economic activity and social institutions as synchronizing with
the revolt from Rome, is to antedate a movement which was not finally accomplished for
another century and a half, and which owed as much to changes in economic and political
organization, as it did so developments in the sphere of religious thought.97

What is so striking about this passage is how little it actually disagrees with what Weber
asserts. Weber fully acknowledges that capitalism predates the Reformation,98 and he
does not argue that the full development of capitalism came during the Reformation
itself, as Tawney’s assertion that Weberians “antedate” the development of capitalism
would suggest.
Weber asserts that the capitalist ethic was an unintended consequence of religious
doctrine posed by theologians such as Calvin. North’s insights show that the Reformation
led to a significant cost reduction “without design, and against the intention of most
reformers” should come as no surprise given the path-dependent nature of historical
change. Furthermore, that the Reformation altered the social and spiritual costs of certain
kinds of behavior implies that Weber, in actuality, argues that the Reformation altered the
institutional constraints on pre-existing behavioral choices. In this sense, since Weber is
addressing these institutional changes rather than the birth of a new type of social
interaction, the fact that examples of capitalist behavior existed prior to the Reformation
only confirms that there was something towards which the Reformation could alter
institutional sanctioning in the first place.
That capitalism existed in Catholic regions does not in any way undermine the
assertion that the Reformation had significant impact on the development of capitalism
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where Protestantism flourished. Though Weber may have been incorrect in his adoption
of historical studies such as Offenbacher’s, which asserted that Protestants were more
prone to enrolling in education conducive to industrialization, and his assertion that
where Protestant populations excelled Catholic populations lagged behind, these
shortcomings do not undermine the theoretical significance of his thesis.
Even these issues of historicity have been debated without a definite conclusion.
H.M. Robertson, writing in 1933, challenged Weber’s thesis on the grounds that Weber
limited his conception of capitalism in a manner that precluded non-Protestant forms of
the phenomenon, and that Weber suffered from the biases and shortcomings of
sociological methodology. In this sense, Robertson’s argument echoes those of Rachfahl
and Tawney. Thus, Robertson claimed that he could prove Weber’s thesis untenable
using the sound method of the historian and by showing that Catholicism had a longer
capitalist legacy than Weber acknowledges.99 Robertson’s considerable efforts, and a
rebuttal from another scholar discussed below, show that proving Weber “wrong” on
historical grounds is not a simple task.
Robertson begins by criticizing Weber’s characterization of Catholic history and
theology.100 For instance, whereas Weber characterized Catholic monasticism as
decidedly removed from the world of the layman, Robertson contests that “To say that is
to ignore the part which the friars were sent out to play –to take religion from the cloister
into everyday life.” Robertson continues that groups such as the Franciscan Order of the
99
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Penitents “called for an asceticism exercised in the world not in the cloister, and it
cultivated some of the bourgeois virtues –the same virtues which Weber stressed…”101
Robertson saw this to be especially true among the Jesuits, who he asserts, in cities such
as Antwerp, “left the way open for an unrestrained individualism in economic affairs.”102
He continues,
The religion of the Jesuits was essentially practical. They gained their experience of
practical affairs not merely through the confessional but also by actual engagement in
business in many cases… The argument that Calvinism relaxed the discipline of the
Christian in his conduct of commercial affairs is untrue. Jesuistry relaxed this discipline
more than any other branch of religion.103

These observations are especially pertinent to this analysis since Robertson’s
assertions directly challenge my hypothesis that Protestantism could act as a cost-reducer
for capitalist behavior. Even if the Jesuits “relaxed” the costs of capitalist behavior more
than Protestantism, this does not mean that Protestantism did not offer a similar (though
perhaps smaller) cost reduction on a larger scale than the Jesuits could possibly achieve
by mere virtue of Protestantism reaching more people. This point is offered by J.
Brodrick, noted below, who states that one of the fundamental flaws of Robertson’s
argument is that Robertson points to the Jesuits when Weber’s primary task was to
understand capitalism in England and North America, where the Jesuits had little
influence. Thus, Brodrick emphasized that “What Jesuits were doing or teaching in other
parts of the world is irrelevant to the issue...”104
In addition to this, two key premises of his analysis show that Robertson’s criticisms
are grounded on misinterpretations of Weber’s claims. Firstly, Robertson states that,
“Even if Weber is correct in his interpretation of the doctrine [of “the calling”] in its
101
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eighteenth-century manifestations, he is incorrect in projecting this back into the
sixteenth century, when the doctrine wore an entirely different aspect.”105 Robertson is
accusing Weber of something which Weber clearly acknowledges: Weber does not
believe that the Protestantism of colonial America is equivalent to that of Calvin-era
Switzerland. Weber’s “projection into the past” is only such a projection insofar as
Weber traces the Protestantism of the United States –the culmination of capitalist ethical
development106– back to its European roots. This is necessitated by the fact that he is
trying to better understand the U.S. as a final product of these historical developments.
To follow any other course would artificially compartmentalize history and suffocate all
hopes of insight. Thus, Robertson’s suggestion that Weber conflates early and late
Protestant attitudes is false: Weber connects them, he does not conflate them.
By understanding Weber’s argument in terms of institutional development, it
becomes clearer that insight is found in searching for the nascent stages of institutional
trends in understanding historical change.107 Since this analysis holds, as does North, that
institutions are fluid, organic phenomena, it should come as no surprise that their early
forms may not resemble their later, more developed stages. The nature of path-dependent
history is such that understanding is achieved through tracing incremental steps
backward, approaching points of origin from which a series of connected events
begins.108 Weber’s focus on the early development of Protestantism in the sixteenth- and
seventeenth-centuries, it follows, is justified.
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Second, Robertson grounds his historical exploration on the faulty presumption that
“If it is true that modern capitalism is the product of a new spirit of capitalism introduced
with the Reformation, it must necessarily follow that there was no capitalism before that
time.”109 Weber sought to understand a “new spirit of capitalism,” not the roots of
capitalism itself, and such grounds for a criticism are egregiously illogical. Just as the
beginning of a new era of art does not mean that art did not exist before that new era,
Weber recognizes that the Reformation did not mark the beginning of capitalism. Weber
could not state this more clearly: “Capitalism existed in China, India, Babylon, in the
classic world, and in the Middle Ages.”110
Pinpointing the origin of capitalism was not Weber’s concern, yet this is how
Robertson portrays Weber’s thesis. Robertson’s effort to locate capitalism in a
predominantly Catholic, pre-Reformation Europe is a futile attempt to refute Weber with
obvious facts that Weber explicitly acknowledges. It is not surprising that Albert
Hirschman, in the beginning of his reflection on the development of capitalism, dismisses
these sorts of criticisms against Weber, clearly endorsing the idea that pre-Reformation
capitalism, while existent, was nonetheless fundamentally different: “No matter how
much approval was bestowed on commerce and other forms of money-making [before
the Reformation], they certainly stood lower in the scale of medieval values than a
number of other activities, in particular the striving for glory.”111
Robertson’s historical claims rest largely on his reading of Jesuit theology as well as
his assertion that the Jesuits allowed a “5 per cent” collection of interest, especially
significant since the collection of interest is an essential component of modern capitalist
109
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activity.112 Despite Robertson’s claims to sound historical method, however, his work
was heavily criticized by another scholar, J. Brodrick, whose Economic Morals of the
Jesuits is “An Answer to Dr. H.M. Robertson.” Brodrick begins by directly attacking
Robertson’s case examples, convincingly showing that what Robertson presents as facts
of the Jesuit worldview are, in fact, interpretations that could just as easily be interpreted
in a manner suggesting that the Jesuits did not support developments that encouraged the
spread of capitalism.
Brodrick points out that Robertson grounds his historical analysis on second-hand
sources and presumptions that what is written, by virtue of its being written, accurately
represents Jesuit attitudes and actions.113 Using simple reasoning, Brodrick shows the
ways in which Robertson “stretched” his sources, gleaning from them the evidence
needed to substantiate his claims. For instance, Robertson asserts that the idea of “the
calling” predated the Reformation in Catholic teachings,114 but Brodrick explains that,
In an earlier part of his book Dr. Robertson found the Puritan doctrine of the ‘Calling’ an
embarrassment. To get rid of it, he attempts to show that the French Jesuits, Bourdaloue,
Crasset, and others, preached the very same thing. The proof of this is nine short
passages, some of them running only to two lines, which he culled from Groethuysen’s
Origines de l’esprit bourgeois en France. In a footnote he tells us that Groethuysen
obtained them from Houdry’s La Bibliothèque de Prédicateurs, but he does not say that
Houdry’s work is in four folio volumes, each running to nearly 800 pages, with double
columns of compressed print. The nine little passages exhorting Catholics to work hard
and to fulfil the duties of their state are rather lost in that tremendous ocean of otherworldly teaching. It really does show how hard up Dr. Robertson was for arguments that
he should have given us this one.115

Amintore Fanfani, writing two years after Robertson, argues that secular forces
created what Weber calls “the modern spirit of capitalism,” though Fanfani finds even
this terminology inadequate. For instance, Fanfani states that “in actual fact, capitalism
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received considerable encouragement from the State in various fields,” continuing that
“Frederick the Great of Prussia, who founded Prussian industry, saw the number of
manufactories increase to 1,902; the 2,000 workers employed in 1765 had become 16,500
twenty years later.”116 One of many secular arguments he presents is that “The absolute
State encouraged early capitalism in another manner by placing cheap labour at its
service.”117 This is a worthwhile and cogent argument (and one reminiscent of the two
arguments posed by Albert Hirschman and Karl Polanyi discussed in greater detail in
Chapter IV), and it is not my goal to refute it here. Instead, I will only note once again
that Weber never denied any of these non-religious factors, he simply chose to focus on a
factor that was religious in nature. Chapter II of this analysis has shown that this choice
was not arbitrary and yielded considerable insight.
Like Robertson before him, however, Fanfani could not help but stage his own effort
at explaining the phenomenon in terms of religion despite his claims to a secular
explanation of the growth of capitalism. Like Robertson, Fanfani credits Catholicism in
ways that Weber does not:
…we find far more solid foundations for the assertion that Catholicism paved the way for
the culminating aspiration of capitalism, a vast and unified market, by maintaining the
unity of faith up to the sixteenth century; by striving to restore political unity through its
assistance to the new-born and never prosperous Holy Roman Empire of the West during
the Middle Ages; by gaining lost outlets for Europe, and the unity of the Mediterranean in
the time of the Crusades; by facilitating the progressive development of colonial policy
through the Missions in modern times.118

These are valid points, but they do not disprove Weber’s argument. Ultimately, Fanfani’s
arguments against Weber are based on the same erroneous grounds that Robertson had
used in his argument: “…Weber’s solution is inacceptable [sic] for various reasons,
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above all because it does not admit that the capitalist spirit existed before the Protestant
idea of vocation.”119
The evidence that capitalism predates the Reformation does not invalidate Weber’s
thesis for two clear reasons. First, as stated above, Weber never denies that capitalism
predated the Reformation. Stark’s dismissal of Weber’s thesis as “so obviously wrong”120
because scholars showed that capitalism predates the Reformation ignores the subtlety of
Weber’s argument as a discussion of rationalization. Reinhard Bendix summarizes the
true objective of Weber’s study in The Protestant Ethic as follows:
…Western civilization came to be characterized by a rational systemization for which
there was no analogue in the Orient. Thus, the study of the Protestant ethic merely
explored one phase of that emancipation from magic, that ‘disenchantment of the world,’
that Weber regarded as the distinguishing peculiarity of Western culture.121

Works such as The Sociology of Religion, which Weber published more than a decade
after The Protestant Ethic, continue to deal with the relationship between the
rationalization of society and the importance of religion. The two were crucial for
understanding historical development for Weber. In his introduction to The Sociology of
Religion, Talcott Parsons writes that “rationalization is, in [Weber’s] view, the single
most crucial dynamic factor in the process of change…”122 And as The Sociology of
Religion shows, Weber attempts to trace the roots of this process to periods long before
the Reformation.
The Reformation and capitalism, if one is to represent Weber fairly in his or her
criticism, must be understood, as Bendix puts it, as “phases” in a larger developmental
process. The question then becomes not “did the Reformation give rise to capitalism?” as
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Rachfahl’s and Stark’s criticisms imply, but instead “what role did the Reformation play
in allowing or encouraging the continuation of a larger process that Weber calls
‘rationalization’?” In the previous chapter, I have shown that Weber’s argument offers a
theoretically convincing mechanism with which the Reformation reduced the costs of
rationalization and, in this sense, made a significant contribution to the development of
capitalism, even if it did not give rise to it in the first place. Still, it should be noted, to
fully answer Rachfahl’s question of “to what extent” was the Reformation important
would require empirical analysis that is beyond the scope of this essay. The point that has
been made here, however, is that the theoretical grounds for such an investigation are
more sound than Weber’s critics, past and present, might lead us to believe.
That capitalism flourished before the reformation in, Venice or Antwerp for example,
shows only that capitalism could exist without the cost-reducing effects of the
Reformation, but it does not rule out that the Reformation had the cost-reducing effects
discussed above. By providing theological sanction for the specialization of labor and the
pursuit of vocational success, it has been shown that the Reformation could have
functioned as a cost-reducer in the process of rationalization. Thus, it may have
accelerated the process altogether and the spread of capitalism with it. The contributions
of North’s institutions theory towards better understanding Weber’s thesis supports the
assertion that the Reformation did not have to be a necessary condition for the spread of
capitalism in order for it to be significant.
In light of the efforts in the previous chapter, this chapter has sought to support The
Protestant Ethic’s continued plausibility, both in itself and by using North’s institutions
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theory, despite the criticisms that have been levied against it.123 The efforts of this
analysis thus far have sought to justify Weber’s efforts as theoretically sound and
empirically difficult to debunk. This, in turn, justifies extrapolating the implications of
Weber’s analysis for broader lessons on analytic approaches to historical and institutional
change, which is the focus of Chapter IV.

iii. Responding to the Demands of Complex History
In many respects, the criticisms noted above reflect the problems and protests that
tend to emerge when an author attempts to unify or blend disciplines –in this case history
and sociology. While social history and sociology have made tremendous strides since
Weber’s death, the criticisms reflecting interdisciplinary tension are still considered valid
and are often reiterated to this day. North’s groundbreaking theories, however, argue that
neither social relations nor history can be neglected if one is to understand the nature of
change in complex societies. In this sense, Weber’s efforts, however flawed and
objectionable they may seem to some, recognized the necessity of applying two
disciplines simultaneously in attempting to explain a major historical developments. This
is the point that Marshall makes at the end of his survey of the debate surrounding
Weber’s thesis:
Because they appreciated this, the sociologists of the ‘classic tradition’ made a crucial
observation, forgetfulness of which has led many into the wilderness of structuralfunctionalism and phenomenology: they recognized that sociology was an historical
discipline. And, in the words of Fustel de Coulange: ‘History is not the accumulation of
events of all kinds which occurred in the past. It is the science of human societies.’ It is,
in short, sociology. The administrative error, because of which two groups of
123
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practitioners currently pursue the same objectives in the separate contexts of discrete
literatures and departments, ought to be rectified as a matter or urgency.124

North’s theoretical insights into Weber’s thesis echo Marshall’s conclusion: social
phenomena and historical developments are inseparable from one another, locked in
chains of reciprocal influence. To attempt to divorce these forces from one another for
the sake of methodological tidiness is to construe reality for the sake of synthetic
conclusions that present interpretations as “objective” fact or proof. The inconclusive
efforts of those who have tried to “disprove” Weber’s thesis are indicative of this.
Weber’s thesis is filled with ambiguities and paradoxes, some of which this analysis has
attempted to address. But such ambiguities do not necessarily signify faulty logic or
analysis.
It has been the concern of this analysis to point out the theoretical relation between
what is normally considered a secular, economic phenomenon, cost, and a subjective,
often religious phenomenon, worldviews or perceptions. I have discussed how cost can
be, in fact, a subjective phenomenon, situated in a particular psychological and societal
context, so as to emphasize that the path-dependent nature of history means that the
sources of, or contributors to significant historical changes are as much a product of the
way circumstances are perceived as they are products of the “circumstances themselves.”
Indeed, given the importance of subjective reality shown by authors such as Weber and
North (though neither of them are self-proclaimed subjectivists) it is questionable
whether reconstructing circumstances “objectively” is a possibility at all. Even if such
reconstruction is a possibility, it is further questionable whether it is worth the effort to
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understand such a reality in trying to better comprehend the mechanisms behind
particular historical developments.
If humans are primarily the cause of change in human history –though exogenous
events such as natural disasters play their own significant role– then understanding the
forces that shape human perception and, more importantly, human actions in response to
those perceptions should be the goal of historical, sociological, and political inquiries.
The subtext of this analysis highlights the importance of beliefs. North’s insights are
significant insofar as they provide us with a comprehensive, though still developing,
analytic lens through which we can understand historical developments while taking
beliefs and perspectives into account.
This success, providing scholars with a comprehensive and coherent analytic lens, is
one that Weber’s analysis was never able to achieve, or at least not to an extent adequate
enough for The Protestant Ethic thesis to avoid being dismissed by many respected
thinkers. As has been shown in this and the previous chapters, North’s theoretical work
can help compensate for these shortcomings, allowing new evaluations of the validity and
plausibility of Weber’s thesis.
This has implications for both the way we understand the history and the present, and
the way we understand important interpretations of history, past and present. No doubt,
different methodologies provide us with important standards of performance in
understanding complex situations, but they also have the possibility of obscuring our
ability to notice insights when they do not conform to methodological norms. I am
certainly not the first to note the possible conflict between methodology and
understanding. Philosophers have struggled with the troubling tension for some time:
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Hans-Georg Gadamer, for example, made it the subject of his seminal work, Truth and
Method (Wahrheit und Methode).
Weber’s thesis does not strictly conform to any prevalent methodological school, and
thus leaves itself open to a wide range of criticisms. While these criticisms are a
necessary step in the analytic process –especially when one is making claims as profound
as Weber’s– they are only useful insofar as they do not obstruct our ability to weigh the
implications for understanding other historical problems. As will be discussed in the
conclusion to this chapter, reassessing Weber’s thesis using North’s institutions theory
shows us that factors such as beliefs and worldviews indicate that perceptions may be the
key to understanding important institutional changes. This understanding can then be
applied to our understanding of history and the history of ideas.
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CHAPTER IV
THE LESSONS OF WEBER’S APPROACH TO INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE
i. Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests and the Importance of Intentions
I will now show how Weber’s thesis might aid us in our approach to understanding
institutions and history. The contribution of this analysis to the study of politics and
society, I will show, is not simply to show that the Protestant Ethic debate remains
unresolved. Rather, this chapter will show why Weber’s approach is significant in
providing novel insight into the nature of institutional change and institutional stability. I
begin this chapter with Albert Hirschman’s The Passions and the Interests, a work
focused on the intellectual development of the capitalism beginning with Machiavelli
(though pointing to writings as early as St. Augustine). The primary purpose of this
section will be to highlight a similarity between Weber and Hirschman with respect to
their mutual emphasis on the importance of intentions in understanding historical change.
Hirschman begins his analysis by raising a question similar to those posed by Weber
in The Protestant Ethic: “How did commercial, banking, and similar money-making
pursuits become honorable at some point in the modern age after having stood
condemned or despised as greed, love of lucre, and avarice for centuries past?”125
Hirschman’s analysis, which follows the development of specific ideas among a range of
Western thinkers, is an alternative to Weber’s thesis, but Hirschman explicitly states that
it is not meant to be a counter-thesis.126 Hirschman argues that the dominance of
capitalism over the Western world developed through the intellectual toils of statesmen
and intellectuals.
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These toils were driven, as is evident in scholars such as Machiavelli and Hobbes, by
a rather grim outlook on human nature and a fear of what would come of human
development if man were left to pursue his natural “passions.” What emerged from this
discourse was a multitude of interpretations of human nature: there were those who
argued that that human passions could be controlled only if pitted against each other;
those who believed that passions were inherently in conflict with man’s pursuing his
“interests;” and then there was Adam Smith, who treated passions and interests as if they
were equivalent according to Hirschman.127 Smith is especially significant in this history
because he marks the maturation of the conviction that allowing man to pursue material
gains is an effective way of preventing him from causing greater mischief and harm by
distracting him from “worse” passions. Left to his own devices, the argument goes, and
without the powerful distraction of capitalist behavior, man is inherently destructive and
driven by unruly passions. According to Hirschman, this idea of this tension between
“passions” and “interests” was created by the fears among intellectuals of the
unpredictable whims of rulers.
Hirschman summarizes the contrast between his and Weber’s thesis as follows:
Weber claims that capitalistic behavior and activities were the indirect
(and originally unintended) result of a desperate search for individual
salvation. My claim is that the diffusion of capitalist forms owed much
to an equally desperate search for a way of avoiding society’s ruin,
permanently threatening at the time because of precarious arrangements
for internal and external order.128

Hirschman grounds his entire analysis in exploring the development of theory of the
state. In this, Hirschman explains the focus of his analysis by drawing a clear contrast
with Weber and scholars affiliated with his approach:
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The beginning of that story does come with the Renaissance, but not through the
development of a new ethic, that is, of new rules of conduct for the individual. Rather, it
will be traced here to a new turn in the theory of the state, to the attempt at improving
statecraft within the existing order. To insist on this point of departure proceeds of course
from the endogenous bias of the tale I propose to tell.129

That Hirschman chooses to focus on statecraft is, indeed, a significant departure from
Weber’s approach, which focuses on the individual’s psychology under pressure of social
and religious change. Nonetheless, the two authors share a more important similarity and
a more fundamental point of departure, what I have above called explained in terms of
the subjectivity of reality, Hirschman calls man “as he really is.”130 Both are functionally
refutations of the rational actor as a useful model for understanding historical change. A
pervasive trend in the history of ideas which Hirschman tracks is an understanding that
idealized rational humans –be they based on Platonic or neo-classical economic ideals–
are not useful in understanding political and social change and, as Spinoza asserts, it is
better to focus on “human actions and appetites,” or, as Rousseau puts it, “Taking men as
they are and the laws as they might be…”131
Chapter I of this analysis established that Weber came from just such a school of
thought. There is no reason that Weber cannot be held among the thinkers considered in
Hirschman’s analysis (though Hirschman, one of his goals being to provide an alternative
to Weber’s thesis, does not do this). Hirschman does, however, implicitly place Weber
among thinkers ascribing to a “psychological” school of thought.132 I will begin by
assessing the validity of Hirschman’s decision to situate Weber in this particular school.
Though Weber is assessing broad social phenomenon, Hirschman is right to note that
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Weber is concerned with psychological sanctions and the decision-making processes of
individuals. Furthermore, there is little mention of the state or statecraft in Weber’s
analysis. Thus, Hirschman is correct in placing Weber in a school of thought that focuses
on individual psychology rather that statecraft.
Yet Hirschman portrays those of this school as believing that humans curb the
influence of passions through “harnessing,” by which Hirschman means “not merely… a
repressive bulwark, but… a transformer, a civilizing medium.”133 In many respects, this
is an accurate characterization of the social mechanisms used in Weber’s thesis. The kind
of institutional change laid out in Weber’s thesis is clearly a form of “transformation,”
and even the adjustment of costs to encourage a particular mode of social behavior
implies a degree of “harnessing” certain types of human action. Furthermore, Weber
asserts that the Reformation and capitalism had the effect of a “civilizing medium” by
furthering the development of rationalization in Western society and allowing the West to
“progress” ahead of other societies.
This notion of harnessing passions according to Hirschman stands in contrast to a
“repressive” stance, which focuses on “holding back, by force if necessary, the worst
manifestations” of human passions. This stance, Hirschman argues, is embodied in the
writings of St. Augustine and was “closely echoed… by Calvin.”134 With this said,
Weber’s place in Hirschman’s categories becomes confusing and paradoxical. On the one
hand, Weber’s thesis, understood through North’s theory of institutional change, suggests
that Weber believed there to be processes of “harnessing” at work in the development of
modern capitalism. On the other, Calvin –a central figure in Weber’s analysis– is
133
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understood as being or in opposition to harnessing through association with a
“repressive” stance. Where does this leave Weber’s overall thesis? And does it suggest
that Weber’s thesis is inherently contradictory?
It should be noted that Hirschman dismisses the insights of both of these schools:
Given the overwhelming reality of restless, passionate, driven men, both the repressive
and the harnessing solutions lacked persuasiveness. The repressive solution was a matter
of assuming the problem away, whereas the greater realism of the harnessing solution
was marred by an element of alchemical transformation rather out of tune with the
scientific enthusiasm of the age.135

In fact, Weber’s thesis shows that Hirschman is too dismissive about the plausibility of
these two understandings of the relation between humans and their interests and passions.
The convincing plausibility of Weber’s thesis when understood through an institutions
theory lens is testament to this. The essence of virtually any economic or game theory
understanding of institutions –North’s included– is that systematic and informal
constraints (read, “repression”) is a real and powerful force in historical development. As
North explains, far from “assuming the problem [of human nature] away,” constraints are
an integral part of preventing humans from allowing passions or interests (this translates
into defection from contracts in North’s terminology) from getting the better of them.
Formal and informal constraints make up the ways in which we consciously and
unconsciously acknowledge problems of human nature; they are not, however, means by
which such challenges are ignored.
The importance of repression is exactly why North dedicates three chapters to the
issues of informal constraints, formal constraints, and enforcement.136 Hirschman’s
dismissal of repression is untenable, and the significance of Calvin’s and Weber’s
understanding human behavior deserves greater attention than Hirschman indicates. In
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fact, Hirschman’s dismissal is more likely the result of his state-centric approach, rather
than his ignoring an otherwise viable argument. Even if state-sponsored repression is a
form of “assuming a problem away,” as Hirschman suggests, by trying to make it nonpresent, such a fact should not prevent a scholar such as Hirschman from acknowledging
the potency of repression in other contexts, such as when induced by religious beliefs.
This is especially the case if Hirschman is going to so willingly point to theologians such
as St. Augustine who, while he did comment on the state, also noted the importance of
repression on an individual level:
Let a man will to be prudent, will to be brave, will to be moderate, will to be just and then
so that he may be able to be these things in reality, let him most certainly desire power,
let him seek to be powerful in himself and (strange though it sounds) let him be powerful
against himself for himself.137

Thus, to imply through omission that thinkers such as St. Augustine were only concerned
with repression with respect to the state is misleading.
The notion of harnessing can also be explained in terms of institutions theory,
specifically with respect to costs. The way in which costs can induce particular
behavioral responses is closely akin to what Hirschman describes as “harnessing.” Costs
provide a structure that limits possible avenues of human action and behavior and, as
humans learn to respond to these cost structures in an attempt to maximize their gain
(both on the individual and organizational levels), entire societies are, in fact,
transformed. Equally important is that incentives can both gently and forcefully guide
individuals and groups in new directions, transforming them.
Though North is clearly concerned with beliefs and ideologies, he never presses his
analysis to the individual/psychological level as does Weber. Nonetheless, North does
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imply that institutional costs can result in psychological institutionalization because
institutions can influence which kinds of knowledge and skills “pay off.” That is to say,
the relationship between costs and incentives is not only pertinent to the organization, it
is also pertinent to the individual in his or her acquisition of knowledge and skills over
time: “…the institutional framework will shape the direction of the acquisition of
knowledge and skills and… that direction will be the decisive factor for the long-run
development of that society.” This is what North characterizes as “maximizing
behavior.”138
This, as has been stated, is a process of gradual change, combining active
“structuring” on the part of significant players as well as the development of informal
constraints over which individuals and organizations may have little control. The
transformative aspect of harnessing, North reminds us, is hardly “alchemical,” but is
rather a natural element of human institutional life. Again, Hirschman is too focused on
the role of the state which, while significant, prevents him from acknowledging that these
theories of human development are constricted by the analytic lens through which he
approaches them.
While Hirschman treats repression and harnessing as autonomous intellectual entities,
we see now that Weber unites them in an historical account of the development of
modern capitalism. Indeed, the poignancy of Weber’s thesis is largely determined by his
synthesis of what Hirschman identifies as the “repressive” intellectual forces created by
thinkers such as Calvin and the “harnessing” of certain human impulses through gradual
societal changes that we can now identify as distinctly institutional in nature. In
Hirschman’s portrayal of the history of ideas, this leaves Weber in a category unto
138
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himself: firstly, Weber is not espousing any particular type of governance unlike many of
the authors noted by Hirschman and, secondly, he does not ascribe to any single school of
thought described by Hirschman. Rather, as was the case with Adam Smith, Weber’s
Protestant Ethic unites schools of thought that Hirschman presents as diametrically
opposed or at least alternative to one another. Weber’s understanding of history as the
development of rationalization and the retreat of magic from human life proves to be far
more multifaceted than Hirschman implies.
This is a small portion of Hirschman’s overall analysis, however, and I have noted it
out not to invalidate or refute Hirschman’s thesis, but to show that there exists inherent
difficulties in situating Weber in Hirschman’s portrayal of the history of ideas. As will be
shown below Weber plays his own role in the discourse about “countervailing passions,”
the discourse at the heart of Hirschman’s analysis and the roots of which might be best
summarized by a quote from Spinoza: “An affect cannot be restrained nor removed
unless by an opposed and stronger affect.”139 In fact, Hirschman’s and Weber’s theses
largely complement each other: the former providing the intellectual and state-centric
side of the same coin on which the latter provides a religio-sociological explanation for
the development of capitalism. Most important of all in this discussion is the way in
which both authors acknowledge the importance of intentions in understanding major
historical change.
Several points in Hirschman’s analysis make this clear. The statement from Spinoza
above was an early form of argument taken up by Hume and the Federalists, among
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others according to Hirschman,140 which asserted that human proclivities toward
malicious passions could only be curbed by pitting human passions against one another.
This is what Hirschman means by “countervailing passions,” a philosophical mode of
thought having serious implications for the way in which thinkers shaped their notions of
statecraft.
Machiavelli provided the grounds for an alteration of this concept, by introducing the
idea that human interests (especially economic interests) could serve as the constraining
force on human passions, the argument here running that a prince’s self-interest would
prevent him from practicing arbitrary or careless rule.141 Of the utmost importance is that
the notion of interests, being that they were grounded in tangible measures of success,
e.g. the length or one’s reign or the size of a state’s gold reserves, introduced an element
of “predictability” and “constancy” absent from unpredictable and arbitrary human
passions.142
Hirschman explains the intellectual appeal of interests as a countervailing force in
opposition to human passions:
The insatiability of auri sacra fames had often been considered the most dangerous and
reprehensible aspect of that passion. By a strange twist, because of the preoccupation of
post-Hobbesian thinking with man’s inconstancy, this very insatiability now became a
virtue because it implied constancy. Nevertheless, for this radical change in valuation to
carry conviction, and to effectuate a temporary suspension of deeply rooted patterns of
thought and judgment, it was necessary to endow the ‘obstinate’ desire for gain with an
additional quality: harmlessness.143

Thus, thinkers such as Steuart and Montesquieu recognized that whereas the man driven
by passions is a fickle and unpredictable beast, the human driven by interests is more
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predictable and, thus, safer. But the pursuit of material interests was still considered a
vice capable of corrupting entire societies, and thus scholars were implicitly charged with
the task of rendering interests harmless if interests were to be justifiably considered a
alternative choice and counterbalance to human passions.
This, according to Hirschman, was a relatively easy and smooth development:
The evaluation of commercial and moneymaking pursuits as harmless and innocuous can
be understood as an indirect consequence of the long-dominant aristocratic ideal. As
noted earlier, when the faith in this ideal had been severely shaken… the long-maligned
trader did not correspondingly rise in prestige: the idea that he was a mean, grubby, and
uninspiring fellow lingered for a long time.144

In other words, the trader and his commerce were considered harmless, especially in
comparison to the glory-seeking of the medieval era, which brought the undesirable
consequence of wars and crusades. Through a plethora of quotations from Samuel
Johnson and Montesquieu, among others, Hirschman argues that capitalism was passively
allowed to emerge, rather than being encouraged by any particular burgeoning ethos. The
story goes that commerce, trade, and interests in general, were treated as a positive
alternative to a more violent and tumultuous past.
Hirschman himself, however, provides a poignant example showing that this change
was not such a fluid transition, and that aristocratic ideals did not fade away while a
passive acceptance of capitalist ideals emerged. Surprisingly, though it is certainly not his
intent, Hirschman shows discontent for the developments described above from none
other than the most iconic figure in the history of economics, Adam Smith. Hirschman
notes that Smith understood the development of capitalism not only as men indulging in
their unruly passions in pursuing their interests (after all, Hirschman notes, Smith
conflates the two terms), but Smith also saw in the rise of capitalism the death of more
144
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noble human attributes, first of which is a “martial spirit,” or the ability for citizens to
fight admirably as soldiers. Smith does not celebrate or passively accept increased
specialization in labor, rather he laments “the man whose life is spent in performing a few
simple operations” as weak in spirit.145
Thus, Smith clearly indicates that not all significant intellectuals thought the
emerging hegemony of the trader to be harmless, and such a conception of harmlessness
was clearly not instilled by an aristocratic ideal. While Steuart and Montesquieu may
have thought it to be so, they cannot be held as representative of an entire European
population over the course of two centuries, especially when thinkers as significant as
Smith seem to think otherwise. It comes as no surprise, therefore, that Hirschman notes
“The Wealth of Nations marks an end to the speculations about the effects of interestmotivated on passionate behavior that had exercised the minds of some of Smith’s more
illustrious predecessors.”146 That Smith’s theories seemed to both eschew and eclipse the
theories of earlier philosophers noted by Hirschman throws into question just how
significant those theorists were in the development of capitalism in the first place; and to
ascribe such developments to Smith would be foolish just by virtue of how late his works
first appeared.147
Ultimately, what Hirschman’s analysis lacks and what Weber’s thesis provides are
mechanistic effects relating to the cost of particular forms of behavior. This is the
institutional mechanism that allows Weber to draw a bridge between the likes of Luther
and Calvin and later developments in the history of modern capitalism. By noting that
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certain, albeit significant, philosophers expressed convictions concerning passions and
interests, however, Hirschman does not construct such a bridge. This is especially true for
thinkers such as Machiavelli, who spent much of his life in political exile and obscurity:
while his place in intellectual history is unquestionably significant, such significance
cannot be necessarily projected back into historical developments that began within two
centuries of his death.
Hirschman suggests in his discussion of the harmless trader that there was never
actually a perceived high cost associated with capitalistic commerce, i.e. a cost that
would need reduction for capitalism to spread as it did. Given the social and religious
proscriptions on industries such as money-lending that existed for centuries leading up to
industrialization, and that even thinkers such as Smith thought that capitalism came with
a lamentable cost, it is doubtful that there was not some sort of cost associated with
modern capitalist behavior leading up to its spread during the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries. I discuss later how both Karl Polanyi and Weber disagree with Hirschman on
this point.
Despite the shortcomings noted above, Hirschman provides considerable insight into
the significance of Weber’s thesis in intellectual history and, from this, how we can
continue to learn from the lessons of Weber’s approach. Hirschman draws attention to the
significance of intentions and expectations in concluding his remarks:
On the one hand, there is no doubt that human actions and social decisions tend to have
consequences that were entirely unintended at the outset. But, on the other hand, these
actions and decisions are often taken because they are earnestly and fully expected to
have certain effects that then wholly fail to materialize.148
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It becomes clear that when Hirschman pointed to scholars such as Steuart and
Montesquieu, he was highlighting that they failed to recognize the potential for interests
to unleash the very forces they were hoping to curb, such as avarice and war. Though he
does not supply the explicit connection that would prove this, Hirschman’s analysis
indicates that in better understanding the intentions of thinkers and statesmen during the
birth of modern capitalism, we might gain insight into the nature of the historical
developments that produced the capitalistic world in which we live today.
With this in mind, Hirschman can offer the answer to an important question: why was
capitalism pursued with such ardor by so many? “In sum, capitalism was supposed to
accomplish exactly what was soon to be denounced as its worst feature.” 149 While
Hirschman does not prove this to be the case, it is a compelling argument which demands
that historians make a more concerted effort to penetrate the intentions of historical
figures and movements in trying to better understand historical change itself. For the
purposes of this analysis, Hirschman’s point is particularly significant. If we are to
ground any analysis on the effects of changing institutional costs, it is necessary that we
explore the origins of these cost changes. Often, pinpointing these origins means
understanding the intentions of individuals and groups prior to the unintended
consequences they may have engendered.
Hirschman notes that the need for this kind of scholarship is particularly dire:
Curiously, the intended but unrealized effects of social decisions stand in need of being
discovered even more than those effects that were unintended but turn out to be all too
real: the latter are at least there, whereas the intended but unrealized effects are only to be
found in the expressed expectations of social actors at a certain, often fleeting, moment of
time. Moreover, once these desired effects fail to happen and refuse to come into the
world, the fact that they were originally counted on is likely to be not only forgotten but
actively repressed. This is not just a matter of the original actors keeping their selfrespect, but is essential if the succeeding power holders are to be assured of the
149
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legitimacy of the new order: what social order could long survive the dual awareness that
it was adopted with the firm expectation that it would solve certain problems, and that it
clearly and abysmally fails to do so?150

Hirschman’s point here is that intellectuals who explicitly or implicitly criticized modern
capitalism, such as Marx, Freud, and Weber, failed to recognize that authors such as
Montesquieu, Steuart, and Smith were searching for alternatives to an earlier world that
“appeared as a menace that needed to be exorcized to the greatest possible extent.”151
This is why Hirschman notes that capitalism was meant to temper the imperialistic and
industrialist forces that later scholars attributed to capitalism. This failure on the part of
scholars such as Marx and Weber, according to Hirschman, is that they did not consider
intentions in their understanding of the intellectual development of capitalism.
Hirschman is correct to emphasize the largely unacknowledged significance of better
understanding the intentions of historical figures and groups. To place Weber among the
ranks of those who have failed to recognize this, however, is to ignore how profoundly
important intentions, expectations, and unintended consequences are in his Protestant
Ethic thesis. Weber expresses this most clearly when he emphasizes that the connections
he draws between Protestantism and capitalism can be understood “only [through] the
knowledge of the original body of ideas” of Protestant thinkers.152 This comes as no
surprise given that Weber’s thesis begins with the intentions of religious leaders and ends
with the unintended economic consequences of those religious intentions. With that said,
Hirschman’s point about the significance of these intentions allows us to recognize a
previously unacknowledged contribution that Weber has made to the study of politics,
economy, society, and history.
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Under the scrutiny of an institutions theory approach, we can now see that Weber’s
Protestant Ethic and the tremendous discourse it generated testifies to the need for
scholars to pay greater attention to the importance of intentions. The importance of
intentions and their inherently idiosyncratic nature throws into question the usefulness of
rational actor approaches to history and politics. Weber’s and North’s emphasis on the
subjectivity of reality is at the heart of this criticism. The inescapability of subjective
interpretations of reality and the power of intentions in understanding the causes of
observable consequences suggests that the study of politics and historical change
demands a more subtle and, in many cases, personal approach. In developing a nuanced
institutions theory of history, North is advocating just such an approach, one that is
further endorsed by Weber, Hirschman, and, as I will explain below, Polanyi.
In light of Hirschman’s reflections on the study of society, Weber shows us that
understanding outcomes and their origins is an approach that, while useful, is incomplete.
North teaches us that understanding history in terms of historical sequence is part of why
“…we have paid a big price for the uncritical acceptance of neoclassical theory.”153
History charges us with not only understanding outcomes and their origins, but also
understanding the hidden intentions that might have led to those outcomes. Most
important of all, we cannot assume that those intentions will be congruent with the
manifested outcomes that are more easily observed.
The important implications of the contributions of Hirschman’s analysis to this
discussion are discussed further below, where I assess the relationship between costs,
institutional stability, and the importance of intentions and expectations. From an
institutions theory perspective, the insights into Weber’s thesis noted in Chapter II of this
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analysis, combined with Hirschman’s broader reflection on intellectual history, indicate
that the relationship between costs and intentions is crucial to understanding historical
change.

ii. A Comparison with Polanyi’s The Great Transformation: Understanding Weber’s Unique
Approach to Institutional Change
Despite Weber’s and Hirschman’s agreement on the importance of intentions in
understanding historical change, they disagree on whether social or political intentions
are the most important to consider. Clearly, Weber believes that religious and social
intentions and expectations were a significant driving force behind the development of
economic forces still present in the world today, whereas Hirschman believes that states
and significant state actors played that important role, rather than marginal or insurgent
social groups.
The question of the relative importance of social and political intentions brings our
attention to another argument that focuses on the role of intellectuals and the state, one
that is both convincing and eloquent, and one which draws clearer connections between
intellectuals, the state, and the development of capitalism than does Hirschman’s
analysis. The argument that the development of capitalism is better understood in terms
of political and economic developments is valid and has been argued convincingly in
Karl Polanyi’s seminal work The Great Transformation: The Political and Economic
Origins of Our Time, published forty years after the first parts of Weber’s Protestant
Ethic thesis appeared in Germany. Polanyi’s work is especially relevant after the
discussion of Hirschman because, as noted above, Polanyi draws clear connections where
Hirschman is unable to fully establish such connections. Furthermore, the differences
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between Polanyi’s and Weber’s account of the origins and development of modern
capitalism shed light on the way in which both approach institutional and historical
change, and why Weber’s approach is unique.
This section will explore these differences while noting how each author emphasizes
the importance of intentions in understanding historical change. In addition, it will be
shown that through institutional cost analysis, Weber provides insight into the
mechanisms for institutional stability where Polanyi is unable do so. The purpose of this
juxtaposition will be to show Weber’s role in the developing (and still relatively young)
discourse about the nature of institutional change.
There are obvious differences between Polanyi’s and Weber’s approach to the rise of
capitalism. The two are concerned, for instance, with phenomena that they label in a
similar manner, but are actually quite different. Weber’s goals and concerns have been
well noted above, and Polanyi differs in that he believes that the modern capitalist world
is a far more recent phenomenon, coming into true fruition as late as the nineteenth
century in the form of a self-regulating global market. Markets have always been present,
Polanyi notes: it is the unregulated global market as an autonomous institutional entity
–the “One Big Market” as he calls it– that makes the nineteenth and twentieth centuries
unique.154 It is the emergence of this particular phenomenon that Polanyi believes
distinguishes the modern capitalist world, and its development is thus the focus of his
analysis. Both Weber and Polanyi are addressing the events that led to the capitalism of
the twentieth century –and in this respect they are both addressing “modern capitalism–
but Polanyi has a far more specific understanding of what that form of capitalism entails.
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Despite these differences, there is a clear similarity in that both Weber and Polanyi
believe that a change in attitudes towards capitalist gain was a significant component in
the development of modern capitalism. I have already made this clear with respect to
Weber, who particularly noted a newfound desire to accumulate wealth as one of the
most important changes of the new capitalistic era; similarly, Polanyi notes that “The
transformation implies a change in the motive of action on the part of the members of
society: for the motive of subsistence that of gain must be substituted.”155 The two
authors, it follows, share a similar conviction that attitudes and beliefs played a part in the
transformation of the pre-capitalist to the modern-capitalist era, though their chronology
on this issue differs markedly.
There is another striking similarity, on a basic level, in the approaches employed by
both authors, though the substance of these approaches is markedly different. Both Weber
and Polanyi turn to a body of thinkers who created (with differing degrees of
intentionality) trends they could not control and which came in forms they did not expect.
This is made abundantly clear in Weber’s discussion of Protestant thinkers, and it is less
explicit, though equally significant, in Polanyi’s discussion of economic thinkers such as
Smith, Thomas Malthus, and David Ricardo. Polanyi understands these thinkers as the
culprits who created the theoretical grounds that justified the existence of the selfregulating market and, thus, the conditions in which man would live in a state alienated
from his natural, societal state.
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According to Polanyi, these thinkers were the creators of the “commodity fiction”156
discussed below, the thinkers that played an essential role in creating, on intellectual and
legislative levels, a conflict between economics and human society. This conflict was
manifested in a struggle between the voting, working-class masses and the powerful
industrialists entrenched in the authority of corporate influence: “Labor entrenched itself
in parliament where its numbers gave it weight, capitalists built industry into a fortress
from which to lord the country.”
This tension was reflected in (and perpetuated by) intellectual discourse as well, with
neo-liberals calling for laissez-faire on the one hand and protectionists calling for
increased state regulation on the other. The result of this conflict was fascism, the brutal
“solution.”157 As explained below, understanding this outcome is a matter of
understanding intentions: neither party to this great tug-of-war described by Polanyi
intended fascism to emerge. Rather we can only access the reasons why this tension came
about, according to Polanyi, through accessing the subjective perceptions of key figures
such as Smith and Ricardo, for example. In understanding their intentions and
expectations for an unregulated economic utopia, we better understand why phenomena
such as the “commodity fiction” ever emerged in the first place.
Though he has a far more fatalistic interpretation of the outcomes, Polanyi shares
with Hirschman the conviction that ideas were a driving force behind the advent of the
self-regulating market, the force that alienated man from his own societal life and
subjugated him to laws that were believed to be universal but which were in fact

156

By this Polanyi means the belief that labor is a commodity, i.e. something produced for market sale. I
discuss this term in greater detail below.
157
Polanyi, 234-6.

90
fictitious. Yet it is clear that Polanyi believes that the perceived universality of these
“laws” influenced the extent to which the these fictions pervaded through all of society:
Ultimately, that is why the control of the economic system by the market is of
overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than
the running of society as an adjunct to the market. Instead of society being embedded in
social relations, social relations are embedded in the economic system… For once the
economic system is organized in separate institutions, based on specific motives and
conferring a special status, society must be shaped in such a manner as to allow that
system to function according to its own laws. This is the meaning of the familiar assertion
that a market economy can function only in a market society.158

Polanyi continues,
It was not realized that the gearing of markets into a self-regulating system of tremendous
power was not the result of any inherent tendency of markets towards excrescence, but
rather the effect of highly artificial stimulants administered to the body social in order to
meet a situation which was created by the no less artificial phenomenon of the
machine.159

These “artificial stimulants” are an admixture of state legislation and intellectual
sanction, the most important of which is the treatment of land, money, and, above all,
labor as commodities “produced” for sale on the open market. Whereas Weber
understand modern capitalism as the product of multiple historical factors, the ethos of
Protestantism being among the most significant, Polanyi understands this same historical
development in terms of a this “commodity fiction,” most important of which is the idea
that labor is a commodity. Polanyi describes this commodity fiction vividly:
None of them is produced for sale. The commodity description of labor, land, and money
is entirely fictitious… Nevertheless, it is with the help of this fiction that the actual
markets for labor, land, and money are organized; they are being actually bought and sold
on the market; their demand and supply are real magnitudes; and any measures or
policies that would inhibit the formation of such markets would ipso facto endanger the
self-regulation of the system. The commodity fiction, therefore, supplies a vital
organizing principle in regard to the whole of society affecting almost all its institutions
in the most varied way, namely, the principle according to which no arrangement or
behavior should be allowed to exist that might prevent the actual functioning of the
market mechanism on the lines of the commodity fiction.160
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Such a fiction, however, only emerged as the result of great effort from a multitude of
important thinkers. It was also aided by costly failed efforts from state regulators, as well
as legislative efforts advocating laissez-faire economic policies. For Polanyi, the advent
of the modern capitalist self-regulated market came at great cost, through great effort,
and, more importantly, only after tremendous change. Unlike Hirschman, who believed
that a predominant notion of “the harmless trader” allowed modern capitalism to ease
into its place of primacy, Polanyi agrees with Weber that it would take significant
restructuring of the institutional matrix and subjective worldviews for the modern
economy to be accommodated in Europe and elsewhere. Furthermore, Polanyi’s analysis
tracks a wide range of changes, some of which were seemingly “small” and insignificant
at the time, e.g. the Speenhamland laws, others more obviously momentous, e.g. the end
of the gold standard. His focus on incremental changes both in state policies and
intellectual trends focuses primarily on a history of marginal changes. This incremental
understanding of the development of capitalism agrees with North’s assertion that
institutional change is predominantly marginal and gradual in nature.
In this respect, we find an implicit agreement between Weber and Polanyi that the
costs associated with modern capitalism had to somehow be reduced if the new
institutional system was to thrive. The authors have different interpretations of how this
reduction occurred –one pointing to the emergence of a particular ethos and the other
pointing to the combined efforts and follies of intellectuals and states– but they
nonetheless both recognize that the advent of modern capitalism was a period of dramatic
institutional changes that needed considerable effort from unique individuals and groups
in order to be fully realized.
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As the creators of this commodity fiction noted above, Smith and his intellectual
descendants in the field of economics created the widespread mental construct which
allowed the economy to gradually (though with great tumult) divorce itself from control
by the state and society. The culpability of these thinkers is only confirmed, according to
Polanyi, by their naïve optimism in the face of growing poverty and hardship, and their
single-handedly corroding man’s moral existence as a political creature –often
unwittingly– and allowing humans to be subjective to “cannibalism in the name of selfinterest.”161 In this sense, Polanyi is more critical of Smith and those who followed him
than Hirschman, who notes that the intellectual thrust of modern capitalism was
originally the opposite of what Polanyi describes it as creating. In other words,
Hirschman explains that capitalism had “good” intentions, but that (as I have quoted
Hirschman above), “capitalism was supposed to accomplish exactly what was soon to be
denounced as its worst feature,” unleashing human evils on a worldwide scale.162
In fact, Smith was not entirely to blame in this according to Polanyi. Polanyi vividly
explains that the dehumanization of Smith’s thought by Malthus and Ricardo (using
Joseph Townsend’s interpretation of human nature) were to blame in creating an
“Economic society… distinct from the political state.”163 Like Hirschman, Polanyi turns
to the intentions of these thinkers to better understand the development of the trends they
instigated. Faced with the unprecedented growth of poverty in the Western world,
Polanyi explains thinkers such as Malthus and Ricardo lured entire societies into the idea
of a laissez-faire utopia in which the free market would maintain the order of a natural
state. Polanyi explains the incongruence between intentions and historical developments:
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“While in imagination the nineteenth century was engaged in constructing the liberal
utopia, in reality it was handing over things to a definite number of concrete institutions
the mechanisms of which ruled the day.”164
As with Hirschman, the intentions of intellectuals such as Smith and Ricardo are
essential for Polanyi’s understanding of historical developments. Polanyi is able to
succeed where Hirschman is lacking, however, in clearly illustrating the consequences of
those intentions. Regardless, both authors make a strong case for understanding
intentions when trying to explain historical change, and Hirschman, Polanyi, and Weber
agree that norms and beliefs (e.g. intentions) matter in understanding institutional change.
Returning to Polanyi’s analysis, he explains that as the market gained increasing
autonomy, both laborers and industrialists alike made the futile effort to tighten their
slipping grasp on mercantilist-era control over markets, which only precipitated the
collapse of the system itself, leading to the two most widespread and bloody wars in
human history in 1914 and 1939. In both cases, the imperialistic “… ‘crafty animal,’ the
politician, had defeated the brain centers of the race –Geneva, Wall Street, and the City of
London.”165 Polanyi does not argue this these consequences were ever the intention of
thinkers such as Malthus. Indeed, thinkers such as Malthus are not given so much credit
for intentional agency, rather they are depicted as intellectuals caught up in the
developing trend of the emerging autonomous market, bringing with them justifications
for and contributions to this development.
In this sense, Smith and later followers play a similar role in Polanyi’s thesis that
Luther and Calvin play in Weber’s: they are each depicted as the founders of a new
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perspective on the nature of human life and the way in which the world works. This is not
to say that the analyses are entirely similar or like-minded. Weber sees Protestantism’s
role as providing the “ethical foundation” for a developing trend of emerging capitalism.
Polanyi, on the other hand, sees man as existing in an alienated context (though not in the
Marxist sense of the term) when the self-regulating market reached full maturation.
Whereas Weber sees the process of rationalization as one of perpetual progress, Polanyi
sees modern man as living in an unnatural state, so much so that it requires tremendous
effort both from intellectuals and the state to allow the market to reach its self-regulating
maturity. It is this approach that allows Polanyi to draw a clearer connection between the
state, intellectuals, and the development of capitalism than Hirschman is able to do in his
reflection on intellectual history.
Given Polanyi’s understanding of man as being in an alienated context, it comes as no
surprise that he understands the development of this conflict leading up to fascism as one
that is tumultuous and disruptive, standing in stark contrast to the gradual process
explained by Weber. It began with the failed attempt to prevent the treatment of labor as
a commodity in England, and the implications of this were of irrevocable importance:
“The attempt to create a capitalistic order without a labor market had failed disastrously.
The laws governing such an order had asserted themselves, and manifested their radical
antagonism to the principle of paternalism.”166 This disastrous effort to resist the realities
of economic changes, Polanyi asserts, marked the beginning of the modern era dominated
by the self-regulating market. Thus, for Polanyi, the “capitalist ethos,” rather than
embodying a work ethic leading to rationalized behavior (even if it does constitute an
iron cage), was a calamitous fiction to which entire nations ascribed. Despite these
166
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differences, however, Weber’s worry about the state of man, which is made explicit in
the conclusion of his essay, is reflected in Polanyi’s outright condemnation of modern
capitalism as the cause of fascism.
Since Polanyi’s conception of the development of capitalism focuses heavily on the
advancement of machine technology (yet another reason why the modern capitalist
context is “unnatural” or artificial for man), some of the developments he explains were
neither the product of intellectuals nor the state, but were the creation of technological
advancement itself. In such a technology-driven conception of the emergence of
capitalism, a capitalist ethos plays a small role because the changes were forced upon
societal norms, rather than societal norms affecting the changes that were realized. In this
process, the state plays the central role of not only being shaped during this process, but
also mitigating the deleterious effects of the burgeoning capitalist world. In this sense, the
state plays a role that is functionally similar to the Protestant ethos in Weber’s analysis.
That is to say, for Polanyi it is the state that equips society with the capacity to handle the
onslaught of economic changes that the new global economy brought upon the world.
This is, in essence, why the state became pitted against the economy in the great conflict
that erupted into the two World Wars, according to Polanyi. In this respect, society and,
to a lesser extent, the state, are relegated to a reactionary role, responding to exogenous
forces in economic development. Thus, though Polanyi believes economics to be
embedded in the functioning of society, the market transcends this embedding.167
With these differences in mind, I will now turn my attention to the lessons common to
Weber, Hirschman, and Polanyi with respect to our approaches to history and historical
change. All three of these authors make intentions and expectations a central component
167
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of their historical accounts, characteristic of authors ascribing to path-dependent
conceptions of history. Despite the dissimilarities between their analyses, they agree on
the significance of these factors. And for good reason: the insights found in each indicate
that intentions and expectations are highly useful approximations and indicators for the
risks that individuals or groups are willing to incur in the process of change. Intentions
indicate the willingness of individuals and groups to experiment and deviate from extant
institutional norms and constraints; it also indicates their understanding of the parametric
and endogenous institutional circumstances168 that surround them. When our efforts to
understand intentions focuses on policymakers, trendsetters, or social groups themselves,
they help us understand why and how certain cost structures (such as cost reductions) and
incentive structures emerged in the first place. Expectations –for success, failure, or
change– indicate how cognizant individuals and groups are of the parametric and
institutional changes going on around them.
North explains the importance of these factors in terms of actors attempting to
decipher the institutional matrices that surround them: “In a dynamic world characterized
by institutional increasing returns, the imperfect and fumbling efforts of the actors reflect
the difficulties of deciphering a complex environment with the available mental
constructs –ideas, theories, and ideologies.” And North notes further that, once a given
interpretation of the institutional matrix is decided upon, the “subjective modeling of the
issues reinforce the course” of developments that commenced with these interpretations
168
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and decisions.169 Thus, the importance of intentions and expectations that I have
highlighted in Weber, Hirschman, and Polanyi agree with North’s understanding of a
world that is heavily influenced by subjective perceptions.
Far from being irrelevant idiosyncrasies or dismissible “opinions,” intentions and
expectations shed light on the likelihood for significant change and, perhaps more
importantly, how change will be received and realized. Polanyi’s analysis shows this
most poignantly: the intentions of capitalists and neo-liberals, on the one hand, and state
regulators and protectionists, on the other, create a vivid history of Europe on a
destructive course towards fascism; Hirschman shows that the significance of these
expectations can be observed in intellectual circles; and Weber shows that the intentions
of religious leaders and an inability to predict how theological tenets would react with
secular phenomena led to a religious movement establishing an ethos for modern
capitalism.
All three authors show us that by probing intentions and expectations we gain better
insight into the way which institutional changes are received by and affect individuals
and groups. Though important, this, in itself, does not distinguish any one of these
authors from previous intellectual achievements. Understanding an author’s intentions,
for example, was the foundation of Schleiermacher’s hermeneutical method, which
stipulated that interpreting texts was a matter of recreating the circumstances around the
author such that we can understand the author’s intended meaning.
Yet Weber’s approach distinguishes itself in another manner. Despite the similarities
noted above, neither Hirschman nor Polanyi provides insight into the specific
mechanisms for institutional stability, which is, no doubt, equally important in
169
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understanding institutional change. Understanding institutional stability is completely
outside the purview of Hirschman’s analysis, and I will not go into greater detail here
concerning why he does not provide such insight; suffice it to say that his focus on
intellectual history makes institutional stability of little concern. His concern is to probe
the intellectual trends behind institutional change rather than the specific institutional
mechanisms that created or maintained stable institutions.
Precisely why Polanyi’s brilliant analysis does not provide such insight deserves
greater explanation. Put simply, institutional stability is not something that Polanyi
considered as relevant or plausible with respect to the self-regulating market. According
to Polanyi, as soon as the system began to rise it also began to collapse. Thus, he was
concerned with institutional instability more than anything else.170 Over half-a-century
after World War II, however, we must exercise the advantages of hindsight that were not
at Polanyi’s disposal (or Weber’s for that matter). The reality of the twentieth century is
that the institutions of modern capitalism have survived, the self-regulating market
included, despite the tumult and disruption of the fascist era.
Polanyi’s account, while he explains how certain “fictions” and institutions were
maintained over the course of nearly two centuries, is one of inevitable and perpetual
decline. Institutions such as the gold standard kept the decline at bay, but it could not do
so indefinitely. While Polanyi thus offers keen insight into the development of modern
capitalism and the importance of intentions and intellectuals, he offers no clear
mechanism for the stability of institutions. This may seem an unfair criticism given that I
have just stated that it was outside of his argument’s main thrust to propose such stability,
170
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but the fact remains that the institutions he said were collapsing now seem to be more
entrenched and stable then ever, more reminiscent of a sturdy iron cage than an
institution heading towards inevitable collapse. My point here is not to say that Weber is
right and Polanyi wrong, rather I mean to emphasize that Weber’s analysis is unique in
offering an approach to institutional change and stability. Some aspects of this approach
are unique to Weber’s thesis, while others are confirmed in their importance by thinkers
such as Hirschman and Polanyi.
Thus, Where Hirschman’s and Polanyi’s analysis is lacking in explaining both
mechanisms of change and mechanisms for institutional stability before and after periods
of change, North’s insights into Weber’s analysis shows that The Protestant Ethic
provides just such a mechanism through the influence of cost on institutional stability.

iii. Cost as a Tool for Understanding Institutional Stability
This deserves greater attention, as it explains why The Protestant Ethic is a brilliant
approach to institutional change and stability. The lessons of this study, I assert, are still
applicable to understanding institutional change today. First, Avner Greif and David
Laitin provide a useful summary of the conditions for institutional change. Central to
their understanding of institutional change is whether or not a given institution exhibits
two traits. First, in order for an institution to be sustained, it must be “self-enforcing,”
that is to say, behavior is shaped endogenously because those who live within the
institution’s influence realize the highest potential for gain if conforming to the given
institution’s constraints. Second, an institution is more likely to sustain itself if it is
(additionally) self-reinforcing, which implies that “over time… the associated behavior is
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self-enforcing in a larger set of situations –other parameters– than would otherwise have
been the case.”
The first of these is a necessary condition for institutional stability, but this condition,
in itself, cannot be sustained without self-reinforcing as well. Thus, the stability of an
institution is contingent on the capacity for that institution to adapt in such a way as to be
able to accommodate an increasing number of potential external shocks and parametric
changes: “a necessary condition for an institution to prevail over time is that the range of
situations in which the associated behavior is self-enforcing does not decrease over
time…”171
Chapter II of this analysis explained the persistence of particular forms of economic
behavior in terms of the Reformation’s effect on costs. That is to say, the spread and
persistence of these institutions were explained in terms of their lowering the cost of
capitalistic behavior –socially, psychologically, and, as noted, spiritually– such that
previously existing predilections towards this behavior were no longer discouraged and,
in some cases, were now actively encouraged. Thus, the most essential factor in
understanding how a religious ethic could become a capitalist ethos and survive processes
of secularization is that aspects of the institutional matrix that made up the original
religious ethic were self-enforcing due to the low costs that came with them.
This leads us to a surprisingly simple possible answer to one of the most debated
questions of Weber’s thesis: how does a religious ethos “survive” secularization? Or,
more metaphorically, we might ask, how was Weber’s “iron cage” made? The process of
institutional change as explained by Weber can now be interpreted as a sort of
institutional filtration through cost. The institutional matrix of Protestant worldly
171
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asceticism brought with it religious tenets, identities, and particular forms of economic
behavior. Given the processes of economic specialization and secularization that were
concomitant with the period Weber assesses, the economic behaviors and convictions
introduced as Protestantism developed (especially in England) came at an increasingly
reduced cost. As Europe and North America continued to become increasingly secular,
the religious components of this institutional matrix became increasingly costly by virtue
of their being less popular, indicated, for instance, by the receding influence of religion in
higher education.172 It then comes as no surprise that we observe the recession of these
religious components along side the stability and persistence of secular institutional
trends and norms.
The implication here is that by reducing the cost of particular forms of behavior
associated with an institution, the institutions become more sustainable. North never
states this outright, but it is implied in the passage quoted in Chapter II of this analysis:
…where the price to individuals of being able to express their own values and interests is
low, they will loom large in the choices made; but where the price one pays for
expressing one’s own ideology, or norms, or preferences is extremely high, they will
account much less for human behavior…173

This is intuitive given that a reduction in cost also implies a reduction in the acquired risk
associated with a particular form of behavior. North understands stability in terms of the
intricacy and pervasiveness of systems of constraint. More specifically, he notes
“Stability derives from the fact that there are a large number of specific constraints that
affect a particular choice” because changing many constraints is most often more difficult
than changing a single constraint.174
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Weber provides a novel interpretation of institutional stability in which the stable
institution –the capitalist ethos– rests, primarily, on low costs and the incentives they
generate. In other words, the stability of the “Protestant” ethic despite the influence of
economic specialization and secularization, rested on its effect of reducing the cost of
behaving in a “worldly ascetic” manner. The power of this reduced cost, and the
subsequent incentives that came with it, on behavior is only enhanced by its shedding the
additional constraints associated with the religious tenets of Protestantism, though it was
also bolstered later by the creation of purely capitalist institutional constraints and
incentives. Institutional stability and stability during times of change are here explained
through the simplicity of cost reduction. Such an historical interpretation, furthermore, is
reliant on acknowledging the importance of intentions and expectations because these
components show why Protestantism precipitated a reduction in behavioral cost in the
first place and the subsequent incentives that emerged, thus justifying the Reformation as
an analytic starting point. Needless to say, cost is not the only important factor in this
process, but it seems to be particularly significant.
For this to be theoretically sound, the reduction in cost of a particular institutional
matrix –in this case, nascent capitalist institutions– must, at least in this case, have the
effect of making the institution or institutions in question more resilient against
exogenous parametric changes. Herein may lie the answer to the question of how an
originally religious institution can survive secularization and become an economic
institution: the components of such an institution, religious or secular, that consistently
maintain a low cost for a particular mode of behavior will be maintained because
individuals and organizations incur less risk when engaging in that mode of behavior.
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North notes that, “Changing relative prices are filtered through preexisting mental
constructs that shape our understanding of those price changes. Clearly ideas, and the
way they take hold, play a role here. The exact mix of the two –price changes and ideas–
is still far from clear.”175 It has been the argument of this analysis that Weber shows
considerable insight into this murky relationship between costs and ideas.

iv. Beyond the Reformation: Applying Weber’s Approach to Other Instances of Historical
Change
History will not always progress along this low-cost path –this is the greatest lesson
of a theory of path-dependent history.176 Nonetheless, costs play a significant part in the
behavioral decisions individuals and groups make. Different historical periods and events
suggest that this is not only applicable to Weber’s analysis and the Protestant
Reformation. This section will address Rogers Brubaker’s Nationalism Reframed:
Nationhood and the National Question in the New Europe, in which he explains that the
Soviet Union, in an effort to provide official social organization for a massive
multinational state, institutionalized national identities that later contributed to the demise
of the Union itself.
Brubaker explains that while Sovietologists believed these national identities to be
“empty forms or legal fictions,” these identities in fact proved to be the salient
foundations upon which groups in places such as Ukraine and Estonia eventually
challenged the Soviet rule that had previously seemed incorrigible and sturdy. Two issues
should be pointed out here: first, Brubaker approaches institutional change not in terms of
constraints and costs, but in terms of “institutionalized cultural and political forms”;
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second, he is not concerned with the intentions of Soviet leaders.177 Despite the
differences between Brubaker’s approach to his study and the approaches assessed in this
analysis, I assert that understanding intentions and costs provides insight into the
phenomena which Brubaker addresses.
Despite his claim that he is uninterested in the intentions of Soviet policymakers,
Brubaker notes at the beginning of his analysis that,
Those policies were intended to do two things: first, to harness, contain, channel, and
control the potentially disruptive political expression of nationality by creating nationalterritorial administrative structures and by cultivating, co-opting, and (when they
threatened to get out of line) repressing national elites; and second, to drain nationality of
its content even while legitimating it as a form, and thereby to promote the long-term
withering away of nationality as a vital component of social life. The annals of
unintended consequences are rich indeed, but seldom have intention and consequence
diverged as spectacularly as they did in this case.178

Brubaker’s pithy statement above provides enough insight to show that Soviet leaders
believed that the institutionalization (through codification) of national classification did
not pose the threat of institutionalizing autonomous national identities. Soviet
policymakers especially did not expect the emergence of identities that might supercede
or supplant soviet identity in the national territories, given that the goal of these legal
nationalities was to do away with the prospect of ethno-national identity and nationalism
in general, counterintuitive as this may sound today.179
Thus, as was the case in Weber’s analysis of Protestant theologians, the intentions of
key figures (in this case, Soviet policymakers) explain how Soviet leadership understood
these policies to be appropriate for the state’s goals towards unification. More
importantly, the intentions of Soviet leaders here shows their willingness to experiment
with issues of national identity and deviate from institutional norms in pursuit of their
177
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goals, which, given that the significance of these national identities was not assured
without the intervention of Soviet laws and codification according to Brubaker, were not
necessarily heading in the direction of unified national identities or autonomy.
Brubaker emphasizes this by noting that before the institutionalization of the Soviet
national territories, national identity “had no territorial component whatsoever.”180 The
Soviet assessment of the institutional state of national identities in the Soviet Union, we
can conclude from this, was one in which distinct and salient national identities were
considered a greater threat if left untouched by Soviet law and regulation than if they
became a part of the Soviet legal system itself. By better understanding Soviet intentions
behind constructing these national institutions, we can better understand the Soviet
interpretations of the particular institutional and parametric matrix in which they lived.
The cumulative effect of these policies, which Brubaker says contributed to the
collapse of the Soviet Union, can be understood in terms of reduced cost structures. In a
state that demanded conformity from its citizenry, individuality in any form came with a
high cost in the Soviet Union, regardless of whether it came in the form of national,
intellectual, artistic, political, or religious individuality. Scientific individuality, in the
form of creative inventiveness, was perhaps one of the only exceptions to this rule due to
the high value placed on advancements in engineering and science in the Soviet Union.
Yet here was a policy that demanded of its citizens that, for organizational and legal
purposes, they take on a form of identity more individualized than that of simply being “a
soviet.” With the institution of national passports in 1932, the cost of ascribing to these
national identities began to drop by virtue of their not being prohibited by the Soviet
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regime. The intentions of Soviet policymakers noted above shows us why these cost
reductions emerged in the first place, now I will explore the effects of those changes.
The approach to institutional change developed from Weber’s Protestant Ethic would
suggest that the low cost of these institutionalized structures would make them
particularly sturdy over time given that individuals and groups can maintain them with
minimal cost and risk. This is, in fact, what we find to be the case during the period
leading up to and after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Given that these nationalterritorial identities could be maintained and, as Brubaker shows, developed at a low cost
(read, relatively low political and social risk) by the inhabitants of these territories,
Brubaker’s conclusions now come as no surprise. Cost reduction explains why we would
expect that, as Brubaker points out, “The welter of national cultures adjusts to fit the
fixed frame of territorial polities,” and that “Culture and territory eventually
converge.”181
It is not my intention to suggest that the stability of low-cost institutions suggests that
high-cost institutions are always unsustainable. Nonetheless, situations such as those
described by Brubaker suggest that decreased costs can play a significant role in
determining choices and even identities because actors can engage in iterated behavior
that reinforces these institutional identities at a low cost and without taking on significant
risk relative to other alternatives.
Second, given the insights of Weber’s thesis, it comes as no surprise that these
institutional structures would survive the demise of the organizations and contexts in
which they were created, just as the Protestant ethic could survive secularization. Despite
their being originally instituted as a means of Soviet sub-state organization, the national
181
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territories have survived as independent states after the fall of the organizational structure
that spawned them. As the forces of modernization made it increasingly costly for the
Soviet Union to hold itself together, the cost of ascribing to territorial identities remained
low, allowing them to survive the Soviet collapse and even contribute to that collapse.
The strength of these institutional structures is only emphasized by the fact that they
continue to exist today despite often conflicting with pre-existing ethno-national
identities in the region.182
No doubt, this has been only a preliminary glance at a complex historical period, and
a more thorough analysis of Soviet social and political history is in order if one is to
make more conclusive assertions. Though only illustrative, the discussion above shows
the promise of the Weber-North approach to institutional change in better understanding
significant historical developments, and it deserves greater exploration, both to
understand its limitations and to realize its full potential. Other examples where it might
be useful begin to arise, such as the entrenchment of ethnic identities and the persistence
of ethnic tensions in Rwanda.
The combination of understanding intentions, expectations, and the effect of
institutional cost as part of a unified approach to historical change is a unique strength in
Weber’s Protestant Ethic thesis. Applying its lessons to history may help us better
understand the persistence of certain institutions and the collapse of others. Applying it to
the political and social world today may help us understand where and when institutions
are likely to thrive or whither. As will be discussed in the conclusion of this analysis,
recognizing the potential of this approach not only changes the way in which we
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understand Weber’s place in the history of ideas, but also provides lessons with the way
that we understand changes as they develop around us.
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CONCLUSION
Hirschman asks historians “not to resolve issues, but to raise the level of debate.” Both
this exhortation and the quote from Marx at the beginning of my analysis ask that
intellectual analysis focus on opening new doors for exploration, rather than desperately
searching for how such doors can be closed and permanently sealed. No doubt, this
analysis has only touched on one of these avenues of exploration, one that I believe is
worthy of further attention but, more importantly, is indicative of the potential lessons
that have yet to be uncovered in Weber’s complex text.
It has been the focus of this analysis to show in what way Weber’s most famous essay
sheds new light on the nature of institutional change and stability, important components
of history that have only recently commanded our consistent attention. This has been
accomplished by critically viewing Weber’s essay through the lens of new theories, while
holding Weber against his critics and alternate theories on the same subject matter. In
doing so, I have shown that Weber’s analysis provides us with a unique model for
understanding institutional change and stability.
Of equal importance is that such an analysis shows that when new theories of history
and society arise, they should not only prompt new reflection on the way we understand
sequences of historical events, causes, and effects, but they should also affect the way we
reinterpret our understanding of history over the ages. That is to say, new insight should
not just prompt a return to history, it should also bring about a return to the ways we have
understood history in the past (especially those that have garnered considerable attention)
and, more broadly, to the history of ideas in general.
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The study of history, both in the past and as it unfolds before us, should be constantly
self-reflexive in this sense. In doing so, it should track not just the events themselves and
their implications, but the traditions of thought we have inherited that led us to these
conclusions: only in this constant reflection will we be reminded to revisit works such as
The Protestant Ethic so that we may learn from them once again and in new ways. And it
is only in the ongoing process of these reflections that we can realize the full potential of
new theories and ideas, such as those written by North in 1990.
One can only wonder how Weber might (or might not) restructure his analysis if he
were alive today and if our knowledge and theories were at his disposal. Such a new
edition of The Protestant Ethic would undoubtedly garner tremendous attention. It should
be equally self-evident, however, that we have no need for Weber to be alive in order to
reinterpret his analysis in a fruitful manner, we need only to continually introduce that
analysis to the new ideas at our disposal. Thus, when the attention towards works such as
The Protestant Ethic begins to wane, it is not a sign that those works are no longer
pertinent or relevant to our understanding of history or the world around us. Instead, such
waning is an unfortunate sign that we, modern interpreters of history, are neglecting the
necessity of reinterpretation and, in doing so, are losing the potential insights that such
reflection has to offer.
With respect to Weber, the next step in this endeavor would be to do a broader
analysis of the themes assessed above as they appear in Weber’s other works. At the very
least, we would gain a better understanding of his body of works and the themes that are
pervasive throughout them, especially those such as Entzauberung and rationalization. If
anything, the above analysis shows that we have not exhausted the supply of lessons
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made available by Weber’s analyses, and these lessons demand efforts that exceed the
limits of this analysis.
Beyond this, the lessons of Weber’s analysis tell us that focusing on perceived costs
may be a fruitful tool for deconstructing periods of complex change and better
understanding the broad mechanisms behind those changes. Likewise, costs can help us
understand the absence of change. How broadly such an approach could be applied is
limited only by the creative liberties the analyst takes with it. More importantly, Weber’s
influential analysis, especially when understood using modern institutions theory,
reminds us that beliefs matter because they, in effect, are the substance that fills the
distance –be it temporal, physical, psychological, cultural, political, or even
metaphysical– between us and the world. What happens in the “space” of this distance is
human perception.
History is primarily concerned with accounting for change and stability: at the heart
of virtually every historical analysis is a question of why something –a particular
circumstance, a trend, a regime– changes or why something does not change. Thus, the
issues of institutional change and stability raised in the above analysis are about our
understanding of history and the way we approach historical analysis. There is clearly
more to Weber’s analysis than just whether he was “right” or “wrong” about the
relationship between Protestantism and capitalism. Assuming that this is the most
important criterion for weighing the value of Weber’s analysis has prevented numerous
scholars, critics, and commentators from exploring the potential of applying Weber’s
approach elsewhere. If history, as North tells us, is constructing and telling stories,183
then our continued understanding and exploration of history is not just about what is told
183
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and how “accurate” the subject of that telling is. It is equally important, if not more so,
how such stories are told and what lessons can be learned from these presentations. This
is echoed in Gadamer’s Truth and Method: “Thus we are certainly interested in the
subject matter, but [history] acquires its life only from the light in which it is presented to
us.”184
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